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Submission to Australian Consumer Law Review 
Issues Paper 
This submission was prepared by Professor Stephen Corones, Professor Sharon Christensen and 
Nicola Howell on behalf of the Commercial and Property Law Research Centre (CPLRC) at QUT. 
The CPLRC is a specialist network of researchers with a vision to reform legal and regulatory 
frameworks in the commercial and property law sector through high-impact applied research. 
The submission addresses particular issues and questions from the Issues Paper related to Lemon 
Laws, transactions involving digital content and the sharing economy, and financial services.   
The numbering of questions from the Issues Paper has been adopted. 
For any queries about this submission, please contact Professor Stephen Corones at 
s.corones@qut.edu.au. 
 
Lemon Laws – Professor Stephen Corones 
12. Does the ACL need a ‘lemon’ laws provision and, if so, what should it cover? 
In relation to ‘lemon’ motor vehicles, information asymmetry, that is where one party to the 
transaction knows more than the other party, is a source of market failure. Motor vehicles have 
become increasingly computerised and complex over recent decades. Manufacturers are not obliged 
to share the technical information, software codes, or other information they might have concerning 
common problems with particular models or batches of vehicle. Information asymmetry makes it 
difficult for consumers to verify the quality of the new car they are purchasing, or bargain for terms 
that are more protective or their rights. 
In 2015-16, Choice conducted a survey of 1,505 consumers who purchased a new motor vehicle in 
the five year period January 2011 to January 2016.1 Some 66 per cent of those surveyed reported 
that they had experienced problems with their cars in the first five years of ownership. One of the 
most common problems reported was in-car technology. According to Choice’s research,  “…on 
average car owners spent $858  and 31 hours trying to resolve their problems”. 
A consumer’s right to have a motor vehicle repaired is not a satisfactory remedy in the case of a 
‘lemon’ motor vehicle because of the uncertainty and frustration suffered by a consumer who must 
continually deal with recurring faults. For many consumers, the purchase of a new motor vehicle is 
their most expensive outlay after their principal place of residence. Many consumers depend on a 
motor vehicle for transportation to and from their place of work, or use a motor vehicle in 
1 See Choice (April 2016), p28. 
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association with their work. Consumer detriment in the case of ‘lemons’ consists of emotional and 
financial stress, which can have a detrimental impact on their well-being and state of mind. 
Manufacturers and suppliers of motor vehicles are obligated under the ACL to meet statutory 
minimum standards in relation to them. For example, the guarantee of acceptable quality in s 54 of 
the ACL is not a guarantee that the motor vehicle supplied will be perfect, and absolutely free from 
defects. Rather, it is a guarantee that the motor vehicle supplied is of a quality that a reasonable 
consumer would consider acceptable, taking into account the circumstances of the particular 
transaction. In particular, the vehicle must be: 
• fit for all the purposes for which vehicles of that kind are commonly supplied;  
• acceptable in appearance and finish;  
• free from defects;  
• safe; and  
• durable.  
The test takes into account:  
• the nature of the motor vehicle; 
• the price of the motor vehicle;  
• representations made about the vehicle (for example, in any advertising, on the 
manufacturer’s or dealer’s website or in the vehicle manual);  
• anything the dealer told the consumer about the vehicle before purchase, and  
• any other relevant facts, such as the way the consumer has driven or used the vehicle. 
The flexibility of the reasonableness test in the guarantee of acceptable quality is intended to 
protect consumers as well manufacturers and suppliers: to protect consumers while not imposing 
unrealistic standards on manufacturers and suppliers. 
Where there is a failure to comply with the guarantee of acceptable quality, the consumer has a 
choice. The consumer can seek recourse against the manufacturer, or pursue the person who 
supplied the goods to the consumer (typically, a retailer or dealer). The consumer's rights against the 
supplier are more extensive than they are against the manufacturer. The consumer can only recover 
his or her losses (monetary damages) from the manufacturer, whereas the consumer has specific 
repair, replacement and refund rights against the supplier. 
The consumer's specific rights and remedies against the supplier depend on whether the fault is 
major, or not major. Section 259 (3) of the ACL provides that if the fault is major and cannot be 
remedied within a reasonable time, the consumer can either: 
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• reject the goods (in which case the supplier would have to collect the goods at the supplier's 
expense if the goods cannot be returned or removed without significant cost to the 
consumer), and, at the consumer's election, obtain a refund or have the goods replaced at the 
supplier's cost; or 
• keep the goods and ask for compensation to make up the difference in value caused by the 
failure. 
• ACL, s 259 (2) provides if the failure to comply with a guarantee is not major and the goods 
can be fixed, the supplier may choose between either: 
• repairing the goods within a reasonable time at the supplier's cost; or 
• replacing the goods; or 
• giving a refund. 
ACL, s 259 (6) provides in all cases (whether the failure is major or not major) the consumer has in 
addition, a right to sue the supplier for any reasonably foreseeable consequential loss or damage. 
The existing consumer guarantees regime is a ‘lemon law’ in the sense that the dealer is not entitled 
to make any number of attempts to repair a defective motor vehicle. Section 259 (2)(b) provides that 
if the supplier refuses or fails to remedy the failure within a reasonable time the consumer may 
choose between: 
• having the goods repaired by a third party and recover the costs incurred from the supplier, or  
• notify the supplier that the consumer rejects the goods, and of the ground or grounds for the 
rejection. 
Where a consumer exercises his or her rights against the supplier, the supplier will have a right of 
indemnity against the manufacturer. Sections 271(1) and (2) of the ACL provide that the 
manufacturer is liable to indemnify the supplier in respect of the liability of the supplier to a 
consumer if the supplier is liable for a failure of the goods to comply with the guarantee of 
acceptable quality in s 54 of the ACL. Section 274(3) of the ACL states that the manufacturer's 
liability to indemnify the supplier is the same as if it had arisen under a contract of indemnity made 
between the supplier and the manufacturer. This means that the manufacturer must hold the 
supplier harmless in relation to the failure to comply with the consumer guarantee. 
The consumer's specific rights against the manufacturer depend on whether the manufacturer has 
agreed to provide an express warranty. Manufacturers generally prefer to repair or replace faulty 
goods rather than pay damages. Section 271(6) provides that where the manufacturer provides an 
express warranty specifying that they will remedy a fault by repair or replacement of the goods, they 
must remedy the failure within a reasonable time. Where the manufacturer has not provided an 
express warranty, or fails to remedy the failure within a reasonable time, the consumer may recover 
damages against the manufacturer in accordance with s 272(1)(a) of the ACL, for any reduction in 
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value of the goods resulting from the failure to comply with the guarantee. In addition, the 
consumer will be able to recover any reasonably foreseeable consequential loss or damage against 
the manufacturer pursuant to s 272(1)(b) of the ACL. 
 
Lack of clarity under the existing law 
The consumer guarantees law contains a number complexities and uncertainties that limit its 
usefulness as a consumer protection measure. These include: 
• A particular difficulty with the definition of “acceptable quality” in ACL, s 54 is that a motor 
vehicle must be durable. There is no definition of ‘durable’. Durability is determined by how 
long a ‘reasonable’ consumer would expect a motor vehicle to last taking into account the 
price paid by the consumer and any representations that were made at the time of purchase. 
It is unclear how long a motor vehicle should last and continue to perform well and not break 
down. 
• The onus is on the consumer to prove that the motor vehicle was not of acceptable quality 
and that it had a defect at the time it was supplied (a latent defect). 
• If the defect is not major the supplier is entitled to remedy the defect, but there is no 
guidance as what constitutes a reasonable period for allowing the supplier to remedy the 
defect. It is also unclear how many times the dealer is entitled to attempt to repair the vehicle 
and what constitutes a ‘reasonable’ time to effect the repairs. 
• A failure in a motor vehicle is major if a reasonable consumer who knew the full extent of the 
problem would not have purchased the vehicle. The supplier or manufacturer who does not 
want to give a refund is likely to dispute a claim by the consumer that it cannot be remedied 
and is a major failure. 
• Where it is a major failure the consumer may nevertheless lose the right to a refund if the 
rejection period has passed. The provisions regarding loss of right to reject the motor vehicle 
and ascertaining the rejection period are complex. 
 
Reform to Reduce Consumer Detriment 
There are a number of possible reforms to deal with the issues identified. First, a consumer should 
be entitled to a remedy for a deemed major failure of the guarantee of acceptable quality if they 
satisfy threshold criteria.  
As part of the Victorian Lemon Law Inquiry, CAV proposed that Pt 2A of the FTA (Vic) be amended to 
create a deemed breach of the merchantable quality implied term as follows: 
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…a deemed breach where the purchaser identifies defect(s) that substantially impair the 
vehicle’s use, value or safety within a reasonable time after purchase and the dealer and the 
manufacturer/importer are unable to repair the defect (s) within a reasonable time. 
However, this leaves open a number of questions. What does “substantially impair” mean? What is a 
“reasonable time” after purchase? What is a “reasonable time” in which to have the defect(s) 
repaired? Uncertainties under the current consumer guarantees regime should be clarified.  
What is required a set criteria or an objective standard by which the faults in a motor vehicle can be 
determined to be a “major” failure, e.g., a deemed major failure if fault cannot be repaired after 
three attempts. A reasonable period to allow the dealer to attempt to remedy the defect in the 
motor vehicle should be specified, such as three months. 
25. Are there any barriers to consumers and businesses enforcing their rights and seeking access 
to remedies under the ACL? Are there barriers to private action that need to be addressed? 
Generally, the sums involved in relation to motor vehicles that are not of acceptable quality will not 
warrant the time and expense involved in bringing proceedings in the superior courts in Australia. 
Most motor vehicle disputes will fall into the category of ‘minor civil disputes’. For example, QCAT 
has jurisdiction to hear to hear minor civil disputes under the Queensland Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld). Sch 3 (definition of ‘minor civil dispute’ and ‘prescribed amount’) 
Minor civil dispute means— 
(b) a claim arising out of a contract between a consumer and trader, or a contract between 2 
or more traders, that is— 
(i) for payment of money of a value not more than the prescribed amount; or 
[...] 
(iii) for performance of work of a value not more than the prescribed amount to rectify a 
defect in goods supplied or services provided; or 
(iv) for return of goods of a value not more than the prescribed amount; or 
(v) for a combination of any 2 or more claims mentioned in subparagraphs (i) to (iv) where 
the total value of the combined claim is not more than the prescribed amount; or 
The prescribed amount means $25,000. 
No specific information is publicly available as to the exact number of motor vehicle disputes 
brought before tribunals. Claims concerning repairs or refunds for defects in motor vehicles are 
classified as ‘minor civil disputes’. However, the relatively small number of reported cases strongly 
suggests that the tribunals are overly formal bodies that are no longer a low-cost alternative to the 
courts not effective. The following four barriers are faced by consumers bringing proceedings in the 
tribunals: 
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• evidentiary issues; 
• consumer risk as to a cost award; 
• period of time taken for a decision to be rendered; and  
• low monetary limits. 
 
Evidentiary Issues 
The first barrier faced by consumers seeking a refund in court and tribunal proceedings is the 
evidentiary burden they must satisfy in proving that a motor vehicle was not of acceptable quality 
and that the failure to comply with the consumer guarantee amounts to a ‘major failure’.  
Courts and tribunals determine rights on the basis of the facts and evidence presented by the 
parties. They provide a process for the resolution of disputes in relation to defective motor vehicles, 
but the process requires a hearing of each party’s evidence and submissions. They are not 
investigative bodies. The time at which goods are to be of acceptable quality is the time at which the 
goods are supplied to the consumer. The onus is on the consumer to prove that there existed an 
inherent defect in the vehicle that was present at the time of supply and that it was the cause of the 
damage suffered by the applicant. However, where a supplier contends that a defect arose after it 
was supplied from abnormal use or lack of maintenance by the consumer, the supplier bears the 
onus of proving that fact. 
In relation to motor vehicle disputes State civil and administrative tribunals operate on the basis that 
the applicant bears the onus of proof according to the civil standard, the balance of probabilities. If 
the applicant fails to adduce sufficient evidence to allow the tribunal to conclude that there has 
been a major failure to comply a statutory guarantee, the tribunal has no choice but to dismiss the 
application. Both parties are likely to give sworn evidence that is contradictory. The applicant may 
present evidence as the general nature of the problem and be accepted by the tribunal to be an 
honest witness. However, honesty is not enough. In order to obtain a refund the applicant must 
present expert opinion evidence that will persuade the tribunal that there is an inherent defect in the 
vehicle that was present at the time of supply; that it was the cause of the damage suffered; and 
that the defect constitutes a major failure to comply with a consumer guarantee. 
The high cost of obtaining inspections and expert mechanical reports may deter some applicants 
from doing so. Motor vehicles are difficult and expensive to diagnose. Thus, a consumer may be 
reluctant to pay, especially where the purchase price of a vehicle is relatively low. In Ross Hereford v 
Automobile Direct Wholesale Pty Ltd the applicant purchased a used 2006 Honda Legend from the 
Respondent in 2014. The applicant drove the vehicle from Sydney to the north coast of NSW where 
he lived. On the drive, the applicant noticed noises emanating from the motor. Two days after 
purchase, the applicant took the vehicle to an independent mechanic. The vehicle was diagnosed ‘as 
having a faulty timing belt tensioner, and a water leak from the cylinder heads’. A further $1,900 was 
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required to determine the nature and extent of the damage to the engine. The applicant was not 
willing to pay this amount and therefore the precise extent of the damage was not known. As a 
result of the lack of evidence the applicant presented, the tribunal was not satisfied that the damage 
to the engine amounted to a major failure.  
In Freestone Auto Sales Pty Ltd v Musulin, Ms Musulin purchased a used car for $31,500. It was 
discovered that the vehicle had previously suffered major mechanical damage and was a “repaired 
write-off”. The dealer had purchased it at an insurance auction and subsequently replaced the 
engine. In 2012, the vehicle was leaking oil, and had difficulty starting. As a result, the applicant 
undertook investigations to determine the cause of the problems. The cost of the further inspections 
was $2000 - $3000. The New South Wales Court of Appeal noted it was arguable that the problems 
with the vehicle ‘were present, although latent, at the time of sale’ but the evidence was not 
sufficient to find that there was a failure to comply with the guarantee of acceptable quality.  
Even if the applicant obtains an expert’s report there is no guarantee that the expert’s report will be 
admissible. In order to qualify as an expert the person must have ‘specialised knowledge’ by reason 
of ‘training, study or experience’. If the expert’s report is admissible, it may not be accepted by the 
tribunal. 
Car manufacturers will generally attempt to repair a defect in a new motor vehicle if it is within the 
warranty period. They may even make multiple attempts at repair. They may be prepared to replace 
the vehicle if these attempts are unsuccessful, but they will resist providing a refund. To get a refund 
a consumer must go to court and prove that the defect constitutes a major failure to comply a 
consumer guarantee under the ACL.  
The onus of proof in court proceedings rests with the consumer. The consumer must satisfy the civil 
standard of proof, that is, on the balance of probabilities. In order to succeed, the consumer must be 
able to diagnose the cause of the fault and prove that it was present at the time the motor vehicle 
was supplied. The consumer must also prove that the defect did not arise from abnormal use by the 
consumer, or from normal wear and tear. Furthermore, the consumer must prove that the defect 
constitutes a major failure to comply with a consumer guarantee. What constitutes a major failure is 
defined in the ACL in terms that are unclear. 
Motor vehicles have become increasingly computerised and complex over recent decades. This 
means that diagnosing the cause of a fault, without access to the relevant diagnostic equipment, is 
an onerous and expensive task. Car manufacturers and dealers are not obliged to share with 
consumers this technical information, the software codes, and the other information they might 
have concerning common problems with particular models or batches of vehicle. 
In litigation, the parties are adversaries. Both parties are likely to give sworn evidence that is 
contradictory. A consumer may present evidence as to the general nature of the problem. The 
consumer may be accepted by the court as being an honest witness. However, honesty is not 
enough. In order to obtain a refund the consumer must present expert opinion evidence that will 
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persuade the court that there was an inherent defect in the vehicle and that it was present at the 
time of supply. 
If the consumer fails to adduce sufficient evidence to allow the court to conclude that there has 
been a major failure to comply with a consumer guarantee, the court has no choice but to dismiss 
the application. The court will not conduct its own independent investigation as to the cause of the 
defect. 
How serious is the onus of proof problem in relation to defective motor vehicles? Since the ACL took 
effect on the first of January 2011, consumers have failed to satisfy the onus of proof in the majority 
of cases involving motor vehicles. For example, in New South Wales, there have been about 20 
reported cases involving defective motor vehicles, 15 of which have been dismissed for failure to 
satisfy the onus of proof.2 
Consumer risk as to an award of costs 
The second barrier faced by consumers in court and tribunal proceedings is the risk that they may be 
exposed to an adverse award of costs if their application is dismissed. In superior courts, the usual 
rule is that ‘costs follow the event’ and an unsuccessful party is generally required to pay the costs of 
the opponent.  Griggs, Freilich and Messel point out, the manufacturer possesses the upper-hand in 
circumstances where the consumer is seeking a refund rather than a replacement vehicle.3 
Assume the manufacturer offers to provide a replacement vehicle and the offer is rejected by the 
consumer. If the consumer’s claim is successful the consumer would be ordered to return of the 
vehicle and obtain a refund of the purchase price under s 259 of the ACL. In such circumstances, 
each party would usually bear their own costs. However, if the consumer’s claim is unsuccessful the 
consumer may be exposed to a costs order to cover the manufacturer’s costs.  
The common law also provides a basis for this through “without prejudice” letters containing an 
offer to settle, referred to as Calderbank offers. Such letters can later be adduced in evidence at the 
costs stage of the proceedings to inform the court as to orders that should be made in relation to 
costs. Section 105 of the QCAT Act 2009 (Qld) provides: 
2 See Salim Investments Pty Ltd v MCM Autos Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCATCD 115 (14 October 2015),[44], [55]–[56] (General 
Member Charles); Freestone Auto Sales Pty Ltd v Musulin [2015] NSWCA 160, [31]–[63] (Simpson J); Hereford v Automobile 
Direct Wholesale Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCATCD 58 (10 April 2015) [48] (General Member Sarginson); Smith v Family Auto 
Group Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCATCD 244 (19 December 2014) [34]–[35] (General Member Sarginson); Mbogua v Mildren 
Prestige [2013] NSWCTTT 293 (21 June 2013) [16]–[19] (Member Levingston); Wise v Tapace Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCTTT 309 
[41] (Member Sarginson); Minaway v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd [2013] NSWCTTT 327 (4 July 2013) [28] 
(Member Eftimiou); Brown v PPT Investments Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCTTT 542 (31 October 2013) [21]–[22] (Member Ross); 
Yaldwyn v Australian Warranty Network Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCTTT 642 (16 December 2013) [15] (Member Holwell); Cosgriff 
v Hyundai Motor Company of Australia Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCTTT 51 (6 February 2012) [15] (Senior Member Durie); Baxter v 
Mazda Australia Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCTTT 251 (5 July 2010) [64] (Member O’Connor); Sankari v GM Holden Ltd [2011] 
NSWCTTT 186 (5 May 2011); Alley v Quayside [2011] NSWCTTT 228 (2 June 2011); Hogan v PTH Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCTTT 
269 (27 June 2011); Neang v Duc Nguyen Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCTTT 363 (11 August 2011). 
 
3 L Griggs, A Freilich and N Messel, Consumer guarantees - lessons to be learnt from afar (2015) 23 Australian Journal of 
Competition and Consumer Law 36, 41. 
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The rules may authorise the tribunal to award costs in other circumstances, including, for example, 
the payment of costs in a proceeding if an offer to settle the dispute the subject of the proceeding 
has been made but not accepted. 
Time taken to resolve disputes  
The third barrier faced by consumers in tribunal and court proceedings is the period of time taken 
for a decision to be rendered. Tribunals are intended to provide a process by which small claims can 
be dealt with quickly and efficiently in a short time frame. However, most tribunals attempt to 
resolve consumer dispute through mediation prior to the matter going to hearing. The period of 
time taken for a decision to be rendered varies. Some decisions take several months, however the 
period of time in others is significantly longer. The occurrence of a compulsory conference may 
extend the time taken for the conclusion of a dispute. Under the current Tribunal procedure a 
consumer is only likely to obtain adequate compensation after a lengthy and arduous process.  
The Consumer Action Law Centre, in its submission to Consumer Affairs Victoria, in relation to the 
Victorian Lemon Law Inquiry stated: 
  Consumer Action does not support a mandatory requirement that consumers attend ADR 
before filing an application in VCAT. Requiring consumers to attend ADR before initiating 
VCAT action will cause delay in consumer claims being finalised, and attrition of claims. In 
Consumer Action’s experience, consumers who have complaints about goods or services are 
often ‘shunted’ between a trader, advice service (such as CAV) and VCAT. This commonly 
results them giving up, with the consumer bearing the costs of defect goods or poor service. 
The goal for any dispute resolution process should be ensure that it is as seamless as 
possible from a consumer’s perspective. Requiring pre-filing mediation simply imposes 
another hurdle in the path of consumers who wish to have a lemon vehicle replaced or the 
purchase price refunded. Making an application in VCAT is difficult enough, and will cause 
attrition of consumers who do not have the skills to make an application or who are 
overwhelmed by the process. Requiring mandatory pre-filing ADR will cause further attrition 
of consumers who are overwhelmed by the greater time and complexity this will inevitably 
introduce. Additionally, in Consumer Action’s experience, a motor car trader that refuses to 
make a refund or replace a vehicle is unlikely to seriously negotiate until VCAT action has 
been initiated. We believe that introducing a requirement that consumers attend ADR as a 
condition precedent to filing a VCAT application will lead to valid cases not being pursued. 
A case that illustrates the protracted nature of tribunal proceedings is Rae v Volkswagen Group 
Australia Pty Ltd. The case concerned a dispute about repairs to a new motor vehicle. The tribunal 
observed:  
…it has been a protracted proceeding over some 2 1/2 years from October 2010 to April 2013 
along the way accruing numerous intermediate steps, orders and directions as follows:   
● Mediation December 2010.  
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● Compulsory conference February 2011. 
● Directions December 2010, January 2011, February 2011, May 2011 (2) August 2011, 
September 2011, March 2012, July 2012. 
● Non-compliance application February 2011.  
● Application to dismiss April 2011. 
● Tribunal orders with detailed reasons 7 February 2011 and 18 November 2011. 
● Respondent’s application to strike out February 2013. 
● Listed for hearing 12, 13 and 14 March 2012 and 8 and 9 April 2013 
In Burton v Chad One Pty Ltd, Mr Burton purchased a 1998 Nissan Patrol on 19 October 2012 the car 
initially experienced overheating on 28 January 2013.  Substantial damage was discovered upon 
dismantling the engine. An action was commenced in the Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal on 
26 February 2013.  The decision of the CTTT was appealed to the District Court of New South Wales. 
The district court concluded that the CTTT erred in finding that a Motor Dealers Act 1974 (NSW) 
form 8 excluded the application of consumer guarantees contained within the ACL. The district court 
remitted the matter to the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal. The matter was decided, and 
subsequently appealed again. The appeal was allowed on grounds that expert evidence was 
unwarrantedly rejected. As a result, the matter is to be remitted again for a further hearing. 
Similarly, in Freestone Auto Sales Pty Ltd v Musulin, Ms Musulin purchased a used car in 2012. The 
vehicle was leaking oil, and had difficulty starting. An action was commenced in the Consumer 
Trader and Tenancy Tribunal on 1 October 2012.  On 29 July 2013 the Tribunal delivered judgment 
dismissing Ms Mussulin’s application. The decision of the CTTT was appealed to the District Court of 
New South Wales. A further appeal to the New South Wales Court of Appeal was decided on 11 June 
2015. 
Low monetary limits 
The fourth barrier faced by consumers in some tribunal proceedings is that the monetary limits may 
pose a bar to many consumers seeking remedies. The upper limit for most tribunals is between 
$25,000 and $40,000. QCAT has jurisdiction over matters that are minor civil disputes. Minor civil 
disputes concern amounts up to the prescribed amount. The prescribed amount is $25,000. At least 
two decisions have had the amount to be awarded reduced to reflect the statutory limit of QCAT 
and NSWCATCD respectively. A large percentage of cars cannot be purchased for less than $25,000. 
As a result, the limit on amounts to be awarded may force consumers to seek remedies in courts of 
law, thereby exposing consumers to higher costs of filing claims and the requirement to seek legal 
representation to ensure that their claim will proceed successfully. 
 For example, in Cicchini v Barbizon Pty Ltd the applicant purchased a new or dealer demonstrator 
vehicle (Alfa Romeo) that had numerous problems. The vehicle was a 2008 model purchased in 2009 
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for $41,050. The dealer dealt with most problems identified by the applicant, the most serious of 
which required a replacement transmission. The applicant’s choice to reduce the amount claimed 
from $41,050 (the price of the car) to the monetary limit of $25,000.  
Similarly, in Taskovski v Otomobile Shoppe Pty Ltd the applicant purchased a second hand vehicle for 
$39,186. Upon collecting the vehicle and driving out of the Respondent’s car yard, the applicant 
noticed several defects and immediately returned the car and demanded a refund.  Ultimately, the 
applicant’s claim was allowed. However, the applicant claimed $52,044, exceeding the tribunal’s 
limit of $40,000. Accordingly, the sum awarded was reduced from $52,044 to $40,000. 
The New Zealand Motor Vehicle Disputes Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine claims where one 
party to the dispute is a motor vehicle trader, and the sum of the claim does not exceed $100,000. 
This limit is more appropriate in the context of motor vehicles than the current limits on tribunals in 
Australia.  
The provision of an appropriate dispute resolution mechanism is an integral part of any consumer 
protection regime. Tribunals lack the specialised knowledge to resolve motor vehicle disputes, and 
consumers, who bear the costly evidentiary onus of proving that the defect was present at the time 
of supply and was not attributable to normal wear and tear. The way these issues are dealt with in 
the United States and Canada will be considered briefly in this part. 
 
27. Are there any overseas initiatives that could be adopted in Australia?  
The provision of an appropriate dispute resolution mechanism is an integral part of any consumer 
protection regime. Tribunals lack the specialised knowledge to resolve motor vehicle disputes, and 
consumers, bear the costly evidentiary onus of proving that the defect was present at the time of 
supply and was not attributable to normal wear and tear. The way these difficulties are dealt with in 
the United States of America (‘US’) and Canada will be considered briefly.  
United States  
In the United States of America there are state automobile lemon laws in all 50 states. At a Federal 
level, the Magnuson – Warranty Act 1975 provides protection for consumers who purchase cars that 
are not free of defects. At a State level the laws provided for the arbitration of disputes and 
mandatory buy back by manufacturers if the arbitrator finds in favour of the consumer. The US 
motor vehicle lemon laws are the subject of Chapter 3 of the Victorian Lemon Law Report. There are 
three main systems of arbitrating consumer disputes regarding lemons. The first and most common 
is administered by the Council for Better Business Bureaus. Another system is administered by the 
National Centre for Dispute Resolution. Further, separate systems exist in some states.  In California, 
the Department of Consumer Affairs regulates arbitration programs. The Council for Better Business 
Bureaus is a national system, with state offices (Better Business Bureaus, BBB). BBB AUTO LINE is a 
system established by BBB to settle automotive warranty claims. It does not charge any fee to 
consumers. Funding is provided in advance by participating manufacturers in order to maintain 
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impartiality. Neutrality is said to be maintained as: BBB’s value to the business community is based 
on our marketplace neutrality. Its purpose is not to act as an advocate for businesses or consumers 
but to act as a mutually trusted intermediary to resolve disputes and provide information to assist 
consumers in making wise buying decisions. 
Ms Donna Stetslow provides a short summary of the Better Business Bureau Auto Line State Lemon 
Law arbitration procedure that exists for resolving disputes under US lemon laws and the legal 
framework supporting vehicle warranty arbitration through the program: 
Initially, the arbitrator must consider whether the vehicle is eligible for relief under the 
lemon law. Most state lemon laws limit consumers’ rights by the time and/or mileage on the 
new or newly leased vehicle, for example, within the first 12,000 miles or within a specified 
period of time. 
Next, a vehicle problem considered initially eligible under most state lemon laws must 
qualify as a ‘‘nonconformity.’’ A nonconformity is commonly defined under lemon law 
statutes as a defect or condition that ‘‘substantially impairs’ the ‘use, value or safety’ of the 
vehicle.’’ Thus, an arbitrator must consider ‘‘substantial impairment’’ as a result of a defect 
or condition. It should be noted that substantial impairment is not limited to mechanical 
defects or drivability; arbitrators are trained to understand that sometimes cosmetic defects 
or problems with interior accessories can be found substantial enough to constitute a 
nonconformity.  
If a nonconformity is found to exist, the manufacturer (through a dealer) must have been 
afforded ‘‘a reasonable number of attempts’’ to repair the nonconformity and not have 
done so. The Pennsylvania lemon law creates a presumption of reasonable number of 
attempts if: 
1. ‘‘the same nonconformity has been subject to repair three times by the manufacturer, its 
agents or authorized dealers and the nonconformity still exists’’; or 
2. ‘‘the vehicle is out-of-service by reason of any nonconformity for a cumulative total of 30 
or more calendar days.’’ 
Finally, if the manufacturer can establish that the nonconformity is the result of the 
consumer’s abuse, neglect, or modification of the vehicle, the consumer is not entitled to 
remedies under state lemon laws”.4 
 
 
 
4 Donna Stetslow, “My Car is a Lemon! Use of the Better Business Bureau’s Auto Line Program as a Pedagogical Model of 
ADR” (2010) 27 (1) Journal of Legal Studies Education 105 at 114 (footnotes omitted). 
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Canada 
The Canadian Motor Vehicle Arbitration Plan (CAMVAP) is "…a national dispute resolution program 
through which disputes between consumers and vehicle manufacturers - related to allegations of 
manufacturing defects or how the manufacturer is implementing the new vehicle warranty - can be 
resolved through binding arbitration.” Most major manufacturers participate in the scheme. 
CAMVAP is available to owners and lessees of new and used vehicles. CAMVAP is voluntary, and 
consumers are entitled to choose between litigation or using CAMVAP.  
If a consumer chooses CAMVAP they must meet the following eligibility requirements:  
1. The consumer must be the ‘registered Owner of [the] Vehicle when the dispute arose’ or ‘a 
single user Lessee under a lease agreement with a term of not less than 12 months and the 
Lessor has signed the Claim Form’; 
a. The consumer must continue to own or lease the vehicle throughout the arbitration. 
2. The dispute with the manufacturer must be about ‘allegations of a Current Defect in Vehicle 
Assembly or Materials specific to Your Vehicle as delivered by the Manufacturer to an 
Authorized Dealer’; The consumer must ‘live in a Canadian province or territory’’. The vehicle 
must have been originally purchased from a manufacturer authorised dealer in Canada; 
3. The vehicle must primarily be used for personal or family use;  
4. The vehicle must be from the current or four previous model years; 
5. The vehicle must not have travelled more than 160,000km; 
6. The manufacturer’s dispute resolution process must have been followed; and 
7. The consumer must have provided the dealer and manufacturer ‘a reasonable amount of time 
and opportunity to resolve the problem’  
 
According to CAMVAP Annual Report 2012-2013, in 2012 there were 203 arbitrated cases, 16 
conciliated cases and 20 consent awards were issued. An additional 36 cases were withdrawn by the 
consumer and 5 cases were found to be ineligible for the program during the processing stages 
before arbitration. 
CAMVAP aims for a dispute resolution time of 70 days.  Consumers and manufacturers may call 
witnesses and give evidence. Evidence given at a hearing ‘will be the most persuasive and 
determinative evidence.’ It is given under oath or by affirmation. Arbitrator’s may also inspect a 
vehicle, or order a technical inspection of the vehicle. This includes allowing an arbitrator to drive or 
operate the vehicle.  
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Consumers ‘are not required to pay any costs relating to the arbitration’ as all costs are fully paid by 
participating manufacturers. Consumers are still responsible for all costs incurred on their own, such 
as the cost of: (i) witnesses attending to give evidence on a consumer’s behalf; (ii) legal fees; (iii) 
travel and accommodation expenses; (iv) interpreter fees, if an interpreter is requested; and (v) any 
amount in excess of $100 for summoning a witness to a hearing, as a $100 reimbursement is 
available. 
 Arbitrators may order the manufacturer to: 
• Repair the vehicle at an authorised dealer at the manufacturer’s expense; 
• Buy back the vehicle; 
• Reimburse the consumer for the cost of repairs already undertaken; 
• Reimburse the consumer for out of pocket expenses incurred prior to the hearing, 
not exceeding $500; 
The Arbitrator can order that the manufacturer has no liability, or that the vehicle is not eligible for 
arbitration. 
Reforms to Reduce Consumer Detriment 
There are a number of possible reforms to deal with the issues identified. First, a consumer should 
be entitled to a remedy for a deemed major failure of the guarantee of acceptable quality if they 
satisfy threshold criteria. The second reform is the appointment of independent assessors to deal 
with the issues of how consumers prove that they meet the threshold criteria. The courts and 
tribunals have not proved satisfactory for hearing motor vehicle disputes because they have no 
power to investigate and no specialised knowledge in relation to motor vehicle disputes. The third 
reform is the establishment of an industry-based consumer dispute resolution scheme.  
• Burden of proof 
One possibility is amending the law to provide clearer rules on the burden of proof. In Singapore the 
Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act (CPFTA) (known locally as the Lemon Law) provides clearer 
rules on the burden of proof.  If a defect is detected within six months of delivery it assumed that 
the defect existed at the time of delivery; if the defect is detected after six months of delivery, the 
consumer must prove that it existed at the time of delivery.5 
• Independent assessors 
A second possibility is amending the law to require the courts to appoint an independent assessor to 
assist in identifying the cause of the fault. The assessor would not form part of the court, but would 
merely be an advisor to it.  
5 See Comparative Analysis of Overseas Consumer Policy Frameworks (April 2016) at 5.6.4.3. Available at 
http://consumerlaw.gov.au/review-of-the-australian-consumer-law/projects/. 
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The cost of securing proof that a consumer has been sold a lemon may prevent a purchaser of a 
lemon from securing justice. The Victorian Lemon Law Inquiry considered the appointment of 
independent assessors to deal with the issues of how consumers prove that they have met the 
threshold criteria set out in the Victorian Lemon Law Report. CCAAC made a similar 
recommendation to the Minister for Competition and Consumer Affairs that: “State and Territory 
governments should give active consideration to the appointment of specialist adjudicators and 
assessors to deal with disputes involving motor vehicles and statutory consumer guarantees”. Such 
assessors would be able to provide impartial advice where the consumer and the manufacturer 
provide conflicting evidence as to the threshold criteria issues.  
• Industry-based consumer dispute resolution scheme 
A third possibility is the establishment of an industry-funded, permanent body to investigate and 
arbitrate motor vehicle disputes. This is the approach that has been adopted in the US, and Canada. 
In Australia, under the current arrangements, a consumer faced with an intransigent car 
manufacturer has little prospect of success in the tribunals and courts. Technical problems in motor 
vehicles are difficult and expensive to diagnose. Consumers are reluctant to incur these costs. Under 
the current arrangements, the cheapest solution for the consumer is to trade in the ‘lemon’ motor 
vehicle on a new motor vehicle, and pass the ‘lemon’ motor vehicle on to somebody else. 
Chapter 5 of the Victorian Lemon Law Report sets out the dispute resolution process that was 
preferred by the various stakeholders who made submissions in response to the Issues Paper. The 
model preferred by many stakeholders was mediation/ conciliation/ adjudication with existing 
bodies to administer the scheme. CAV would act as the mediator and VCAT as the adjudicator if CAV 
was unable to resolve the dispute and the consumer wished to seek a legal decision. 
However, in its submission to the Victorian Lemon Law Inquiry, CALC proposed a different basis of 
dispute resolution. CALC proposed that an industry- based external dispute resolution scheme be 
introduced:  
Consumer Action does believe more could be done to improve dispute resolution in the motor car 
industry. In particular, we believe the introduction of a compulsory industry-based external dispute 
resolution (EDR) scheme would be an excellent way of improving the resolution of consumer 
disputes in relation to motor cars. Industry-based EDR schemes exist in many other industries, 
including energy, water, telecommunications and financial services. Generally, such schemes are 
supported by consumers and industry alike, as they provide cheap, fair and accessible dispute 
resolution…The Victorian Government could introduce an industry-based EDR in the motor vehicle 
industry by making membership of such a scheme a condition of holding a licence to trade in motor 
vehicles. If such a scheme were introduced, consumers would have access to a cost free dispute 
resolution service (all costs being paid by industry), that is independent, and that can make decisions 
binding on the industry member. We strongly welcome further consideration of such a scheme as 
part of the current consultations”. 
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Industry-funded ADR schemes do not simply mediate or conciliate disputes; they investigate the 
facts of a particular dispute. The Productivity Commission in its Review of Australia’s Consumer 
Policy Framework, strongly supported the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) schemes since 
they “…generally offer relatively economical, accessible, fast arrangements for dealing with 
individual complaints that could not be cost effectively tackled using any other method”.6  
 
Transactions related to digital content – Professor Sharon Christensen 
11.  Are there any changes that could be made to improve their effectiveness, or address any 
of the issues raised in section 2.3? Are there any gaps that need to be addressed, or overseas 
models that could provide a useful guide? 
 
Many of the specific protections provided by the ACL rely upon the definitions of ‘consumer’, ‘goods’ 
and ‘services’. Uncertainty can arise about the application of the specific protections, particularly 
statutory guarantees to products with digital content. There is a need for the review to address the 
application of specific protections to both digital products and traditional products incorporating 
digital content. 
 
There are a number of key issues which should be considered in relation to the application of statutory 
guarantees in the digital economy: 
• Which statutory guarantees apply to digital products and services? This requires a re-
consideration of the definitions of ‘goods’ and ‘services’. The characterisation of 
digital products as either ‘goods’ or ‘services’ impacts the type of guarantee that is 
applicable. 
• Should statutory guarantees apply to the supply of all goods or services provided online, 
irrespective of the type of transaction or identity of the seller? This requires a 
consideration of the definition of ‘supply’, the auction exclusion for some guarantees and 
the ‘trade or commerce’ requirement particularly in the case of transactions within the 
sharing economy. 
• Does the current statutory guarantee regime offer effective protection for Australian 
consumers purchasing from overseas providers? 
 
 
A. Digital products – the definitions of goods and services 
 
Online or digital products may not fall easily within traditional concepts of ‘goods’ or ‘services’ 
resulting in uncertainty about the application of consumer guarantees. This can arise in a number of 
situations: 
6 Productivity Commission, Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, Final Report No 45 (2008) vol 2, 199. 
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i. Some common products, such as refrigerators now may also include the acquisition of 
software connecting the fridge to the internet. Is this a purchase of goods or services or 
both?   
ii. Case law both nationally and internationally has struggled with the legal characterisation of 
digital content supplied via a download from the internet. The definition of ‘goods’ in the 
ACL currently includes ‘computer software’, which means that software provided by way of a 
disc or a download is within the definition. Despite this extension of the definition, recent 
case law highlights the continuing potential for a lack of clarity about the nature of data, 
such as music, information or advice, downloaded via the internet, which does not include 
software. If this type of information does not fall within the definition of ‘goods’ the 
guarantee of acceptable quality will not apply. 
 
The only jurisdiction to enact specific legislation to regulate product quality for digital content is the 
United Kingdom (Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK)). 
 
• Why is the characterisation of digital content important? 
 
The characterisation of digital content or products as ‘goods’ or ‘services’ it important for determining 
the standard of quality the product must meet. Goods obtain the benefit of the guarantee of ‘acceptable 
quality’ (s 54 ACL). There is no equivalent for services which are instead required to be fit for the implied 
or express purpose made known by the consumer (s 61 ACL). Acceptable quality is a broader concept and 
will require the goods to be fit for all purposes for which the goods would ordinarily be used. Goods that 
are not fit for one of the purposes for which they are normally used, will not be of acceptable quality.7 
Appearance and finish, being free from inherent defects, design defects, manufacturing defects or 
instructional defects and being safe to use are all attributes of acceptable quality.  
 
• Does digital content fall within ‘goods’? 
 
Goods and services are both defined widely in s 2 of the ACL.  
 
The definition of ‘goods’ in s 2 ACL includes various goods, chattels, vehicles, minerals and crops as well 
as ‘computer software’. Computer software was added to the definition in 2010 due to uncertainty about 
whether software fell within the ordinary meaning of ‘goods’.8   
 
‘Services’ is also broadly defined in s 2 ACL so that any item not categorised as ‘goods’ will be services.9  
It is important to note that a supply of goods cannot also be a supply of services. The two are mutually 
7 Hardwick Game Farm v Suffolk Agricultural Poultry Producers Association [1969] 2 AC 31, 78-79. 
8 In the case of State Sale of Goods Acts software downloaded from the internet to a computer was not a supply of ‘goods’ 
under the Act.8 In contrast in Goldiwood Pty Ltd t/as Margaret Franklin & Associates v ADL (Aust) Pty Ld t/as Adviser Logic 
[2014] QCAT 238 web-based software provided for financial planning was held to fall within the definition of ‘goods’ in s 2 
of the ACL, because of the inclusion of ‘computer software’ in the definition 
9 The definition of services does not include financial services which are regulated under the ASIC Act. 
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exclusive and if the product supplied comes within both definitions it will be a supply of goods. It is 
possible however for one transaction to include separate supplies of goods and services. This approach 
has been applied by courts in the case of computer software supplied by way of a computer disc or 
USB.10 
 
On the basis of the current definitions computer software provided on a disc or USB or downloaded from 
the internet will fall within the definition of goods in the ACL. On the other hand digital data that does 
not contain executable code, such as pictures or music is unlikely to fall within the definition.  The issue 
was recently considered in the decision of ACCC v Valve Corporation [2016] FCA 196.  Valve Corporation is 
a computer game developer and supplier which is incorporated, and based, in the State of Washington in 
the United States. Valve Corporation operates and controls: 
1. a website located at http://store.steampowered.com (the Steampowered Website); 
2. an online computer game delivery platform called “Steam“ which is an application that a 
consumer can download from the Steam Website to install on to a computer or electronic 
device; and 
3. an online support assistance service known as “Steam Support“ accessible from Steam or 
the Steampowered Website. 
The ACCC alleged misleading conduct on the part of Valve constituted by representations on their 
website about the applicability of statutory warranties to their products. The ACCC alleged that “goods” 
were supplied by Valve Corporation either because software was supplied, or because Valve Corporation 
bundled software and services, and the definition of “goods” includes computer software. Valve 
Corporation denied that it supplied “goods” within the meaning of “goods” in s 2(1) of the ACL alleging 
that it supplied “online access to video games via a subscription service“. Valve argued that their product 
was a “service“ within s 2(1) of the ACL so that the consumer guarantee of acceptable quality in s 54 did 
not apply. 
 
The Court concluded that the contract between Valve and the consumers was a contract for the supply of 
goods because the primary supply by Value to its customers was computer software. This conclusion was 
reached after a detailed forensic analysis of the nature of the digital product provided by Valve and the 
court acknowledged that other non-executable data, such as music and pictures did not necessarily fall 
within the definition of ‘goods’.   
 
Although the decision in Value provide some further certainty about the approach a court may take it is 
clear that whether a particular digital product is ‘computer software’ or some other type of digital 
content will depend in each case on the particular product. Ultimately this does not provide the required 
level of certainty and simplicity for the ordinary consumer to be able to determine if they are acquiring 
goods to which the guarantee of acceptable quality applies. 
 
Further even if the analysis in Valve is adopted more widely by Australian courts there are still a number 
of uncertainties that may arise: 
10 Toby Constructions Products Pty Ltd v Computa Bar (Sales) Pty Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 48; St Albans City and District Council 
v International Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 481. 
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I. If the software downloaded is ‘goods’ the statutory guarantee of acceptable quality will 
usually only apply if the software is supplied for consideration in trade and commerce. If the 
software is given for free to the user there is no consideration and the question is whether 
this is a ‘supply’. Is the situation distinguishable if the subsequent service (ie downloading 
data using the software) is for a monetary fee? Is it possible to argue the provision of the 
software together with the data was a ‘sale’ for consideration? 
 
II. Is the ‘service’ provided by the supplier the right to access the data for the purpose of 
download or the actual downloaded data?  Is the downloaded data actually a different 
service or should it be characterised as ‘goods’ to obtain the benefit of the ‘acceptable 
quality guarantee’ rather than only attracting the benefit of the guarantee in s 61 ACL of fit 
for the consumer’s implied or express purpose. In Valve the structure of the transaction and 
the close connection between the software and the data resulted in the whole of the 
transaction being characterised as a supply of goods. If the predominant supply is instead 
digital data or the supply is a subscription service which does not require software a 
different conclusion may be reached. 
 
III. As technology changes the methods for delivery and access to digital data will change. It is 
foreseeable that computer software may not need to be provided as part of the supply of 
the data. For example, a subscription service to stream movies to a computer does not 
usually include the provision of software to the consumer by the supplier. This will mean the 
supply is more likely a supply of services to which the guarantee of acceptable quality does 
not apply.   
 
• International solutions 
 
The only jurisdiction to specifically enact legislation to overcome the difficulty of characterisation of 
digital content is the UK. The Consumer Rights Act 2015 introduced a new definition of ‘digital 
content’ and specific consumer protections, including statutory warranties.  Digital content is 
defined as ‘data produced and supplied in digital form’. This broad definition applies to digital data 
or content irrespective of the delivery method for the data.  
 
The effect of the CRA is that consumer warranties related to satisfactory quality clearly apply to both 
goods and digital content, irrespective of the medium of purchase. Similarly warranties as to fitness 
for the purpose, satisfactory quality, to be as described and guarantees of title (or in the case of 
digital content the ‘right’ to sell) also apply to both.  Similar to the supply of goods the provisions 
apply only to the supply of digital content where the consumer pays for the content. Although the 
implied terms are the same, the relevant criteria related to satisfactory quality are altered to 
accommodate the different nature of digital content. For example, ‘appearance and finish’ are 
relevant to satisfactory quality of goods (s 9(3)(b) but not relevant to digital content (s 34).   
 
Remedies available to consumers are also consistent except that a consumer is not entitled to reject 
digital content, but can insist on repair or replacement, the right to a price reduction and the right to 
a refund. An additional remedy is provided to a consumer where digital content damages a device or 
other digital content belonging to a consumer (s 46). A consumer is entitled to request the trader 
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repair the damage or compensate the consumer for the damage. Importantly s 46 applies even if the 
consumer has not paid for the digital content. 
 
The UK provides a potential model for consideration as part of the ACL Review. 
 
B. Impact of online sales methods on threshold concepts 
 
The increased transformation of consumer transactions to online mediums has resulted in a number of 
significant changes to the traditional sales model used by traders or retailers. This in turn impacts on the 
responsiveness of a consumer protection framework based upon concepts developed in a traditional face 
to face model.   At a policy level this requires a reconsideration of the types of transactions to which 
statutory guarantees should apply.  Under the current regime statutory guarantees are applicable only to 
the ‘supply’ of goods or services to a ‘consumer’ and in some cases the supply must be in ‘trade or 
commerce’ and cannot be a ‘sale by auction’.  
 
Are these threshold requirements for the application of statutory guarantees necessary or desirable in a 
digital environment? 
 
Each of the threshold requirements is considered in the context of online transactions. 
i. ‘Supply’ 
A person will supply goods to another person where the goods are supplied (including re-supplied) by 
way of ‘sale, exchange, lease, hire or hire-purchase’.11 Notably, the definition requires that some 
consideration be paid in exchange for the goods and, therefore, statutory guarantees will not generally 
apply to the supply of goods by way of gift.12 A supply of services occurs where the services are ‘provided, 
granted or conferred’.  
 
Clearly an online transaction in the following form is a supply: 
• sale, lease or hire of traditional goods (books, watches, appliances etc) via an online site; 
• a provision of services via an online medium (eg cloud computing services, IT help services, 
digital professional advice) 
• sale of software provided by wave of a disc or USB is a supply of goods, due to the inclusion 
of computer software in the definition of goods. 
 
Potentially the definition of supply means that the following transactions fall outside of the ACL: 
• Sharing or exchange via a peer to peer platform.  
11 Supply is defined in s 2 of the Australian Consumer Law. 
12 Note s 5 Australian Consumer Law which provides a ‘donation’ of goods or services is not a supply unless for promotional 
purposes and s 266 of the Australian Consumer Law which applies where a consumer who acquires goods gives them to a 
third party. The third party will be able to enforce the statutory guarantees in relation to those goods as if it were the 
consumer of the goods. 
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Whether the person is ‘supplying’ goods or services may depend on the form of the 
interaction. The view taken by a court may be influenced by whether consideration is paid or 
operates in a commercial context. For example the sharing of household items13 between 
individuals while resembling a lease or hire arrangement, may not be a supply if no money is 
paid. In contrast, a person who provides ride sharing services through Uber in exchange for 
payment will probably be considered by a court as supplying a service. Clarity about whether 
the transaction is for goods or services is relevant to the applicable guarantees.    
 
The uncertainty created for consumers in the context of transactions via peer to peer 
platforms needs careful consideration. The nature of the supply may vary depending upon 
whether a person is supplying a product (such as selling their car on Gumtree); selling by 
‘auction’ on a shared marketplace or ‘sharing’ their car via ride sharing platform or a car 
sharing platform. What guarantees of quality is the consumer entitled to expect?   
 
• Online auctions  
A number of the statutory guarantees (ss 54-59 ACL) do not apply to goods sold by auction. 
The phrase sale by auction is defined as, “in relation to the supply of goods by a person, 
means a sale by auction that is conducted by an agent of the person (whether the agent acts 
in person or by electronic means).” The justification for excluding auctions from statutory 
guarantees is that the consumer has an opportunity prior to the auction to evaluate the 
value of the goods. Online auctions by their nature do not allow a potential buyer to inspect 
the goods.  While the rationale may continue to have relevance in a physical auction, buyers 
of goods through any online medium and irrespective of the method of sale are unable to 
inspect the goods prior to agreeing to buy. Even though some online auctions may not fall 
within the definition of ‘sale by auction’14 there are cogent reasons for removing the 
distinction in the context of online transactions and maybe for all transactions.15  
 
ii. ‘Consumer’ and ‘Trade or Commerce’ 
 
The final two threshold requirements are for the supply to be to a consumer in the course of trade 
or commerce. Transactions where the seller is engaged in a private sale or where the buyer is a 
business will not gain the benefit of the statutory guarantees. In the context of online transactions 
the requirement for the transaction to be in trade or commerce allocates risks to consumers as it is 
difficult to distinguish in an online environment between a person acting in trade and commerce and 
one that is not. In some cases it will be clear, such as buying a used car on Gumtree, but in other 
cases such as on EBay it is not necessarily obvious whether the sale is with a trader or an individual 
merely selling household items. 
 
Similarly the definition of ‘consumer’ as discussed above means that small business owners 
13 Gumtree, Etsy, The Clothing Exchange, TuShare. 
14 Smythe v Thomas [2007] NSWSC 844. Whether particular online auction sites fall within the definition will depend in 
each case on the role of the auction website in the transactions. Malam v Graysonline, Rumbles Removals and Storage 
[2012] NSWCTTT 197. 
15 For an examination of this issue refer to Kate Tokeley, Towards a New Regulatory Regime for New Zealand Online 
Auctions [2011] New Zealand Law Review 91. The exception for auctions was removed from the New Zealand Consumer 
Guarantees Act 1993 in 2013. 
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purchasing goods or services online (above the relevant threshold amount) are unable to obtain the 
benefit of the guarantees. This ignores the fact that in the case of online transactions all buyers, 
whether consumers or business are in a similar position. Usually there is little opportunity to 
negotiate the terms of the agreement and no opportunity to inspect the goods. Whilst many online 
sellers offer to accept returns and provide refunds if the goods are not acceptable, this is not a 
consistent practice. 
 
• Trade or commerce  
 
Generally the statutory guarantees in the ACL apply to the supply of goods or services in trade or 
commerce. Trade or commerce is defined in s 2 of the Australian Consumer Law to mean trade or 
commerce within Australia or between Australia and places outside Australia and includes any business 
or professional activity. The phrase is generally given a wide meaning and applies to activity that is of a 
business or commercial nature.16 According to the existing authorities, a person will supply goods in trade 
or commerce where a person supplies goods in the course of any business or commercial transaction, 
even though the person is not in the business of supplying those or any other goods.17 This represents a 
significant change from the position under the implied warranties imposed by the Trade Practices Act 
1974, which applied if goods were supplied to a consumer in the ‘course of a business’ carried on by the 
supplier. The use of ‘trade or commerce’ demonstrates an intention to broaden the scope of the 
guarantees.  
 
The supply of goods or services by a business will fall within the concept of trade or commerce 
irrespective of whether it is online or through other means. The difficulty with the restriction to supplies 
in trade or commerce is that despite the relatively wide interpretation given by the courts a supply of 
goods or service by an individual, who is not carrying on any business, will not be subject to statutory 
guarantees.  It is clear in Australia18 that private sales of goods, services or real property are not 
considered to be ‘in trade or commerce’ unless they form part of a scheme or transaction engaged in for 
profit and the characteristics of the parties indicate the activities are commercial rather than personal in 
nature.  
 
The increased use of peer to peer platforms mean that more consumer to consumer transactions are 
taking place that may fall outside of the statutory guarantee regime. It appears that Uber drivers 
generally and Airbnb hosts that rent rooms or dwellings for a number of occasions each year, are likely to 
be engaged in activities for profit that are commercial rather than personal in nature. If that is the case, 
then both the Uber drivers and the Airbnb hosts may be considered to be ‘engaged in trade or 
commerce’ and be caught by the relevant consumer protection provisions contained in the ACL. At what 
16 Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson (1990) 169 CLR 594; Bond Corporation Pty Ltd v Theiss Contractors Pty Ltd 
(1987) 14 FCR 215. 
17 This should be contrasted with the statement in Consumer Guarantees – A guide for business and legal practitioners 
http://www.consumerlaw.gov.au/content/the_ACL/downloads/consumer_guarantees_guide.pdf  that ‘Trade or 
commerce means in the course of a supplier’s or manufacturer’s business or professional activity, including a non-profit 
business or activity’ [8]. 
18 See most recently Williams v Pisano [2015] NSWCA 177. 
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point a person’s activities move from personal to commercial in nature is not a straightforward question 
and potentially creates uncertainty in the application of existing consumer protection provisions within 
peer to peer transaction. For example, if an Uber driver who drives as part of his/her main occupation 
picks up passengers in-transit between meetings, is this an activity which is commercial or merely sharing 
their empty vehicle with another person? 
 
Sales of goods by non-business entities continue to be subject to the implied terms regime of under the 
relevant Sale of Goods Act in each state. Whilst it is possible to contract out of these implied terms, non-
business entities are unlikely to include such exclusions in their contracts of sale unless advised to do so. 
Consequently these sales are likely to be subject to similar warranties of quality and fitness for purpose 
but the specific remedies provided by the ACL are not available to the buyer.  
 
iii. Other models 
 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 similarly limits the operation of statutory guarantees to supplies by 
traders to consumers. The consequence of this approach is that only consumers who acquire goods 
from traders are entitled to the remedies provided in the Act. 
 
iv. An alternative approach 
 
If the policy were to ensure application of guarantees of acceptable quality in most transactions, 
particularly online, an alternative approach the Review may consider is to broaden the application of 
the guarantees but differentiate the available remedies. Differentiation occurs to some extent 
already within the ACL in relation to contracting out of contracts for consumer goods (s 64) 
compared to contracts for non-consumer goods (s 64A).  
 
 
C. Application to overseas suppliers 
 
The application of the statutory guarantees may be impacted by rules governing choice of law clauses in 
contracts.  The purpose of s 67 of the ACL is to limit the circumstances in which statutory guarantees can 
be displaced by a choice of law clause in a contract choosing another jurisdiction as the appropriate law. 
Section 67 provides: 
If: 
(a)  the proper law of a contract for the supply of goods or services to a 
consumer would be the law of any part of Australia but for a term of the 
contract that provides otherwise; or 
(b)  a contract for the supply of goods or services to a consumer contains a term 
that purports to substitute, or has the effect of substituting, the following 
provisions for all or any of the provisions of this Division: 
 (i)  the provisions of the law of a country other than Australia; 
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(ii)  the provisions of the law of a State or a Territory; 
 
the provisions of this Division apply in relation to the supply under the contract despite that 
term. 
 
In ACCC v Valve Corporation the court held that the effect of s 67 was: 
(i) If the law of Australia is the proper law of the contract s 67(a) will make a clause that chooses the 
law of another contract invalid; 
(ii) If a clause of a contract specifies the law of another country as the law of the contract or specifies 
provisions of another law of a contract as applicable, s 67(b) will render the clause ineffective. 
 
The only situation in which s 67 will not apply is if the proper law of the contract is the law of another 
country and there is no governing law clause in the contract to which s 67 can apply. In ACCC v Valve the 
proper law of the contract was Washington but the clause specifying Washington law as applicable to the 
contract was struck out by s 67(b) and the law of Australia was substituted.  
Whilst the decision in Valve clarifies the operation of s 67, it also demonstrated the complexity of its 
application for the average consumer. 
 
An alternative is to provide, similar to the UK and European Union regulations, for all relevant contracts 
entered into with Australian consumers to be subject to the statutory guarantees, irrespective of the 
locality or business operation of the supplier. 
 
Online shopping – Professor Sharon Christensen 
34. Is it sufficient for a business to disclose the total minimum price before making a payment, 
or should optional fees and charges also be disclosed upfront? 
35. Are there any changes that could be made to the ACL to improve pricing transparency? 
 
Unfair or misleading pricing practices are problems in all forms of commerce. The prevalence of 
misleading pricing practices, such as drip pricing and surge pricing, appears to increase in online 
transactions. 
Consumer behaviour research suggests in the case of drip pricing that:  
• Consumers overspending on products and services (endowment effect): Misleading prices 
may lead to consumers spending more than they need to, buying a product which is not best 
for them, wasting time or suffering annoyance, disappointment or regret.19  The Office of 
19 Refer to Amelia Fletcher, Drip pricing: UK experience (21 May 2012) Federal Trade Commission 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/economics-drip-pricing/afletcher.pdf . 
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Fair Trading has estimated that UK consumers spent £300 million in 2009 on payment 
surcharges.20 Drip pricing was found to have the most egregious effect. 
 
• Consumers can be misled by cheap headline prices (anchoring): Research suggests that 
consumer purchasing decisions are driven by which supplier is offering the cheapest 
headline prices.21 This occurs where the consumer focusses solely on the most important 
piece of information and disregards other potentially detrimental information. 
 
• Consumers who start a process are unlikely to walk away (commitment and consistency) 
 
Surge pricing is also recognised as a consumer problem in online transactions. Although consumers 
are vulnerable to price exploitation in times of peak demand, research suggests that regulators 
should aim only to correct market problems and go no further.22  From an economic perspective 
surge pricing is a normal part of supply and demand in the market. When supply is low and demand 
is high the price rises so as to ration supplies and encourage new supplies. In the case of ride sharing 
platforms, such as Uber, the surge in price is to encourage more drivers to provide services in times 
of peak demand 
 
A. Current approach 
 
To date the ACCC has taken action successfully in relation to drip pricing practices in the airline 
industry. (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 
1263 and Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Virgin Australia Airlines Pty Ltd [2015] 
FCA 1263).  These proceedings were based upon s 18 and 29 of the ACL and require the pricing 
practice of the trader to mislead consumers. The advantage of this approach is that the lack of a 
positive obligation to disclose pricing information at a certain point in the transaction allows 
flexibility to business in development of websites. Disadvantages exist however for the regulator 
which must undertake time intensive investigations and evidence of misleading conduct to 
encourage changes in practice. 
 
 
B. Alternative approach 
 
The UK approaches the issues of pricing through a combination of prohibitions on unfair commercial 
practice and a requirement for online traders to disclose certain price information to the consumer 
early in the transaction. The justification for imposing price disclosure is based on the view that both 
drip pricing and surge pricing create issues of information asymmetry for consumers limiting their 
20 Office of Fair Trading OFT to take action over passenger travel sector payment surcharges (28 January 2011) 
http://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-1.nsf/0/13A505722AF49487802578BD0049001F?OpenDocument.   
21 Refer to Amelia Fletcher, Drip pricing: UK experience (21 May 2012) Federal Trade Commission 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/economics-drip-pricing/afletcher.pdf. 
22 Nayeem Syed, ‘Regulating Uberification’ (2016) 22(1) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 1, 10. 
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ability to make an informed choice to purchase. This fact is further justified by reference to 
consumer behaviour research.  
 
Prohibition on unfair commercial practice   
• Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (UK) SI 2008/1277 (‘CPR’), 
 
Under the UK CPRs pricing practices that may constitute drip pricing can be challenged on the 
basis of misleading conduct (acts or omissions) or under the broader prohibition of unfair 
commercial practices provision (reg 3 CPRs). The concept of an unfair commercial practice 
potentially extends the circumstances in which redress may be sort by a consumer or regulator. 
It is not necessary for the commercial practice to be misleading in order to prove that it 
“materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the average 
consumer with regard to the product”.  Evidence of consumer biases will be relevant in 
demonstrating the behavioural response of the average consumer. 
• Pricing Practices Guide (‘PPG’) - guidelines for business to implement fair and transparent 
pricing practices in accordance with the CPR 
 
Information disclosure for internet contracts 
 
• Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013. 
 
The Regulations apply to a contract entered into over the internet between a trader and consumer. 
The purpose of the Regulation is to ensure consumers are provided with clear information about the 
main characteristics of the goods or digital content, the total price, delivery charges, total cost of a 
service or subscription over the period of the agreement and the total period of the contract. The 
trader must ensure the consumer, when placing the order, explicitly acknowledges that the order 
implies an obligation to pay.  If the order is placed over the internet any button activating the order 
must be clearly labelled. A failure to comply with these requirements will allow the consumer to 
terminate the contract. 
 
• Electronic Commerce (EU Directive) Regulations 2002 
These Regulations establish legal rules that online retailers and service providers must comply with 
when dealing with consumers23 in the 27 member countries of the European Union (EU). The 
Directive dictates the information that consumers must be provided with in online transactions. If a 
retailer/service provider fails to provide information required by the directive, its contract with the 
consumer may be invalid and it may be in breach of member state retail law.  Prescribed information 
includes price, shipping and any other costs. Any breach of these requirements is considered a 
breach of statutory duty. If the consumer is not informed of how they can amend errors in an order, 
23 Services covered by the directive include paid-for and free online information services provision, and online selling of 
products and services such as advertising, professional services, entertainment, and Internet and telephony service 
provision 
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the contract can be voided. 
 
Similar disclosure obligations exist in Canada for distance selling contracts, which is applicable to 
internet contracts. 
C. Potential issues for further consideration 
 
As part of the ACL Review the following issues may be further investigated: 
(i) Whether the general prohibition on misleading conduct is sufficient to guard against drip 
pricing. A specific protection on the basis of an unfair commercial practice could be 
considered. The broader definitions of unfair commercial practice in the UK and US are 
potentially wider  
(ii) Whether s 29(1) of the ACL should be expanded to false or misleading conduct to allow a 
civil penalty for misleading omissions. 
(iii) Whether a requirement for disclosure of all elements of the price prior to ordering goods 
should be introduced. Proof of non-compliance with this type of provision is easier for 
regulators as compared to proving a dripped pricing approach is misleading or deceptive. 
Although there has been success with misleading conduct in Australia, prosecution for 
failure to comply with a positive disclosure regime is in most cases more effective.  
 
 
37. Do the existing ACL provisions (including provisions on false or misleading 
representations) adequately address issues regarding the transparency of comparator websites 
and online reviews? How could this be improved? 
Online reviews and endorsements ‘provide consumers with information about products, services 
and businesses based on the experiences of other consumers’24 and are an important tool for 
consumers in an online market.  Review mechanisms available range from customer reviews and 
endorsements on product websites to independent websites that conduct reviews of products25  or 
allow consumers to post reviews.26 More recently, as the benefit of positive endorsements to 
suppliers has been realised it has become more common for feedback left on websites and other 
peer-to-peer platforms to be untrue or not wholly reflective of the suppliers conduct or 
reputation.27 According to research conducted by the University of Illinois at Chicago,28 almost 30% 
of reviews and endorsements are posted by individuals employed to write them. For example, sites 
24 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Managing online reviews, Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission https://www.accc.gov.au/business/advertising-promoting-your-business/managing-online-reviews. 
25 For example, Choice (www.choice.com.au); Product Review (www.productreview.com.au). 
26 This is common in the travel industry with websites such as Tripadvisor, Expedia and Trivago.  
27 Kat Kane ‘The Big Hidden Problem with Uber? Insincere 5-Star Ratings’, Wired (online), 19 March 2015  
http://www.wired.com/2015/03/bogus-uber-reviews/ ; Cohen, Schneider & O’Neill LLP, Product Reviews, Endorsements 
and Astroturfing (30 October 2015) Cohen Schneider & O/Neill LLP http://www.cohenschneider.com/product-reviews-
endorsements-and-astroturfing/. 
28 Karen Weise, ‘A Lie Detector Test for Online Reviewers’, BusinessWeek Magazine (online), 29 September 2011 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/a-lie-detector-test-for-online-reviewers-09292011.html. 
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such as freelancer.com welcome businesses to offer jobs for writing fake reviews and there are a 
number of fake review writers who offer their services on websites such as Fiverr.com in exchange 
for free products or services.29  
 
Fake reviews and endorsements are most commonly used in travel, electronics and home repairs30 
but can be found across almost all platforms selling goods or services over the Internet. 
 
The current approach to regulation and enforcement includes a combination of: 
 
• General prohibition of misleading conduct/representations (s 18 and s29 ACL) 
• Specific prohibitions related to false and misleading advertising, testimonials or claims of 
endorsement 
• Guidelines/codes specifically directed as ensuring traders understand how to guard against 
fake online reviews or endorsements  
• Detailed consumer information readily accessible on regulators website which assists 
consumers to identify fake or false reviews, best practice for obtaining accurate reviews of 
products online, reputable trusted comparator websites. 
• A broad range of enforcement mechanisms are available to the regulator under the ACL 
including corrective advertising, disclosure orders, agreement to a compliance/education  
program for employees, undertakings to remove the reviews, the imposition of civil 
penalties or a criminal prosecution 
 
This combined approach is consistent with the approach in other jurisdictions and appears to allow 
action to be taken by the regulator in relation to the main practices identified as leading to fake 
reviews:  
• Businesses commission or write fake negative reviews about other businesses. These 
reviews make false, negative claims about an experience with a product, service or business;  
• Businesses commission or write fake positive reviews about themselves  which make false, 
positive claims about an experience with a product, service or business;31  
• Review sites or businesses cherry pick positive reviews and suppress negative reviews 
without making it clear negative reviews are not included; 
• Endorsements are commissioned where the reviewer is offered an incentive, or has a 
commercial relationship with the business whose goods or services are being reviewed.32  
 
 
29 David Streitfield, ‘For $2 a Star, an Online Retailer Gets 5-Star Product Reviews’, New York Times (online), 26 January 
2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/technology/for-2-a-star-a-retailer-gets-5-star-reviews.html?_r=2&hp;  Mary 
Pilon, ‘A Fake Amazon Reviewer Confesses’. The Wall Street Journal (online), 9 July 2009 
http://blogs.wsj.com/wallet/2009/07/09/delonghis-strange-brew-tracking-down-fake-amazon-raves/. 
30 Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Online reviews and endorsements: Report on the CMA’s call for information’ 
(Report, Competition and Markets Authority, 19 June 2015) 29. 
31 Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Online reviews and endorsements: Report on the CMA’s call for information’ 
(Report, Competition and Markets Authority, 19 June 2015) 21. 
32 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Managing online reviews, Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission https://www.accc.gov.au/business/advertising-promoting-your-business/managing-online-reviews. 
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Sharing Economy – Professor Sharon Christensen 
38. Does the ACL provide consumers with adequate protections when engaging in the 
‘sharing’ economy, without inhibiting innovation and entrepreneurial opportunities? 
39. Does the ACL provide adequate clarity and certainty for consumers when engaging in the 
‘sharing’ economy? What areas need to be addressed, and what types of personal transactions 
should be excluded? 
 
The rapid growth of the sharing economy33 through peer to peer platforms, such as Uber and 
Airbnb, presents challenges for the existing consumer protection model. Similar issues of product 
quality, misleading pricing and other practices and misleading reviews as apply to other online 
transactions also apply to the sharing economy.  An important consideration in any review of these 
provisions is to ensure application consistently to all forms of digital or online transactions. 
 
The different nature of sharing platforms raises several policy questions that may be considered: 
 
1. Consistent regulatory model: Should regulation treat all suppliers of goods or services, 
whether a large corporation or an inexperience individual, in the same way? Does the 
variation in the market between sharing of assets by individuals via peer to peer platforms 
and business to business transactions34 mean there is too much complexity for a one size fits 
all regulatory model? 
2. Platform liability: Should the regulatory provisions of the ACL (or similar legislation in other 
jurisdictions) apply to both the supplier and the platform provider?  What should the 
responsibilities of the platform provider be for the conduct of the supplier? 
3. Consumer to consumer: Should the regulatory regimes traditionally focused on business to 
consumer transactions be broadened to clearly apply to peer to peer transactions, where 
the supplier may not be in the business of providing the goods or services? Should the 
regulatory model include some protection for consumers transacting with other consumers? 
Minimum standard or quality or minimum information disclosure requirements?   
4. Balance of Regulation and self- regulation: Is there a need to adopt a different regulatory 
model for e-commerce? Is a different balance required between government regulation and 
industry self-regulation to encourage innovation? 
5. Multi- jurisdiction compliance: the ability or willingness of platform operators to comply 
with laws of the various jurisdictions in which they operator are low. This encourages 
platform operators to disclaim or contract out of regulatory requirements. 
 
Many countries have been grappling with the balance between encouraging and fostering 
33 Sharing economy has been defined as ‘online platforms that help people share access to assets, resources, time and 
skills. (Debbie Wosskow, Unlocking the Sharing Economy: An Independent Review. (available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/378291/bis-14-1227-unlocking-the-
sharing-economy-an-independent-review.pdf)  
34 Some examples are BrandGathering (online platform that connects businesses to undertake joint marking and branding 
activities helping to save money) and Nimber (sharing of logistics). 
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innovation within a digital economy and the need to build consumer trust35 in online transactions 
and maintain consumer protections where appropriate.  Most international jurisdictions have 
adopted a cautious approach to intervention in the sharing economy and peer to peer transactions. 
Regulators globally have commissioned reports investigating the nature of the sharing economy and 
identifying potential market issues with a view to determining the nature and extent of consumer 
related issues within the sharing economy. 36  
 
Most commentators recommend a flexible regulatory regime which is capable of dealing with 
unique issues that arise from each platform type,37 provides adequate protection for consumers but 
does not create barriers to innovation and further development of the sharing economy. Traders 
within existing markets disrupted by new platform entrants have a different view and have called for 
equality in application of regulation, particularly in the context of licensing regimes. Most 
jurisdictions have responded to consumer protection concerns arising from peer-to-peer platforms 
by attempting to apply existing laws and regulations.38 In Australia the existing general protections 
and specific protections have been successfully used to ensure compliance by e-commerce 
businesses and peer to peer platforms. Educational campaigns are also used to ensure consumers 
and small businesses are fully aware of both their rights and responsibilities under the ACL, and to 
encourage compliance by businesses. 
 
The primary difficulty in the context of a peer to peer transaction is whether existing laws apply to 
the platform operator as well as the seller of the goods or services who may be an individual not 
engaged in trade or commerce.  
  
35 Trust in a sharing platform is identified as one of the major issues for consumers by PWC in The Sharing Economy (2014), 
available at https://www.pwc.com/us/en/technology/publications/assets/pwc-consumer-intelligence-series-the-sharing-
economy.pdf. 
36 D Wosskow (2014) Unlocking the sharing economy – an independent review , Report for the Minister of State for 
Business, Enterprise and Energy   ; Deloitte Access Economics The sharing economy and the Competition and consumer Act 
2015;   Deloitte Access Economics, Review of the Collaborative Economy in NSW, 2015; Christopher Koopman, Matthew 
Mitchell & Adam Thierer, The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The case for Policy Change, Mercatus 
Research 2014. 
37 Anna Fellander, Claire Ingram and Robin Teigland, ‘Sharing Economy: Embracing Change with Caution’ (Naringspolitiskt 
Forum Rapport 11, Entreprenorskaps Forum, 2015), 59; Vanessa Katz, ‘Regulating the Sharing Economy’ (2015) 30 Berkley 
Technology Law Journal Annual Review 2015 1067, 1087. 
38 (Will Coldwell, ‘Airbnb’s legal troubles: what are the issues?’ The guardian (online), 8 July 2014 < 
http://www.theguardian.com/travel/2014/jul/08/airbnb-legal-troubles-what-are-the-issues>; Raphael Minder and Mark 
Scott, ‘Sharing Economy Faces Patchwork of Guidelines in European Countries’ New York Times (online) 21 September 
2014 < http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/technology/sharing-economy-faces-patchwork-of-guidelines-in-european-
countries.html?_r=0>). 
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ACL and Financial Services – Ms Nicola Howell 
2.4.2 Interaction between the ACL and ASIC Act 
This part of the submission discusses the relationship between the Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’) 
and the consumer protection provisions of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Act 1988 (Cth) (‘ASIC Act’). It is therefore most relevant to issue 2.4.2 (Interaction between the ACL 
and ASIC Act) in the Issues Paper. 
The Issues Paper includes specific reference to the differential treatment of financial services 
compared to the rest of the economy in a number of places, and includes reference to: 
• The exclusions on insurance contracts from the prohibition against unfair contract terms 
(p16) 
• A reference to the fact that quality for financial services is addressed through an implied 
terms regime, rather than the consumer guarantees regime introduced in the ACL, and 
whether the consumer guarantees should be extended to financial services (p21); and 
• A question on whether the current approach to defining a financial service in the ASIC Act 
creates unnecessary complexity (p34).  
The following addresses each of these specific issues, but also make some broader comments on the 
way in which the carve-out of financial services from general consumer protection legislation has 
been implemented.  
General approach 
The primary submission in this section is that the generally applicable consumer protections should 
apply to financial services in the same way that they apply for all other goods and services in the 
economy. There should not be a differentiation in the broad consumer law standards applicable to 
financial services when compared to other goods and services, unless there is a strong, evidence-
based policy justification for any divergence. However, as is discussed below, there is currently a 
divergence, with limited policy justification given. Indeed, much of the explanatory material for the 
ACL reforms supports the existence of consistent standards for financial services and for other goods 
and services.  
For example, the 2009 Intergovernmental Agreement for the Australian Consumer Law required the 
Commonwealth Government to amend the ASIC Act (and as necessary, the Corporations Act) to 
ensure that they were consistent with the ACL.39 Similarly, the explanatory memorandum for the 
Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Bill (2009) notes ‘The Bill also amends the 
consumer protection provisions of the Australian Securities and Investments Act 2001 (ASIC Act) to 
make them consistent with the TP Act and the ACL’.40  
In the Explanatory Memorandum to the 2010 Bill it is explained that amendments to the ASIC Act 
and the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘CA’) will be  made ‘where appropriate’, but apart from a 
39 Clause 3.1.3.  
40 At page 3, emphasis added. 
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reference to the constitutional reasons for including the consumer protection provisions in the ASIC 
Act rather than the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (‘CCA’), there is no discussion of the 
circumstances in which it would be ‘appropriate’ to have differences between the substantive law in 
the ASIC Act compared to the ACL in the CCA.41 The Explanatory Memorandum notes that ‘the IGA 
does not require the corporations legislation to be identical to the ACL legislation’, and that the IGA 
‘reflects that financial products and services will be carved-out of the scope of the ACL as a result of 
the separate legislative arrangements that exist in respect of financial products and services under 
the Corporations Agreement 2002’.42 However, there is no substantive discussion about the reasons 
behind having different standards for financial products and services. 
Consistency of general consumer protection standards across the financial services sector and the 
rest of the economy is also consistent with the recommendation of the Productivity Commission in 
its 2007 Review of Consumer Policy that a new generic national consumer law should apply to all 
sectors of the economy, including financial services43 and with the 1997 Financial System Inquiry 
(‘the Wallis Inquiry’). Prior to the implementation of the recommendations of the Wallis Inquiry, the 
economy-wide consumer protection standards in the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (‘TPA’) 
applied to the entire economy, including the financial services sector. The Wallis Inquiry 
recommended a separate consumer protection regulator and regulation for financial services, but 
did not recommend any change in the substance of the general consumer protection laws as they 
applied to financial services.44   
The policy justification for treating investors and consumers differently  
One possible justification for differential treatment of the financial services sector has traditionally 
been that those purchasing financial products and services are considered to be investors, rather 
than consumers, and that investment is different to consumption. Investment is about risk-taking; 
no investment is risk-free; and there is no guarantee of positive outcomes in the case of investment 
products. This was clearly the view of the Wallis Committee, which explained: 
Unlike the consumption of products or services in general, many investments provide a 
return to investors based on their bearing a share of the risks which are intrinsic to financial 
activity. This clearly distinguishes the act of investment from the act of consumption. Among 
the risks that investors may be rewarded for bearing are those deriving from imperfect 
information. It is vital to economic efficiency that regulation not unduly interfere with this 
risk allocation function of the financial system.45 
41 At page 4. 
42 At page 456. 
43 Productivity Commission (2008) Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework (Final Report, Vol 2, April), 
Recommendation 4.2. 
44 See discussion in Productivity Commission, ibid, 75. 
45 Commonwealth of Australia (1997), Financial System Inquiry (Final Report, March), 177; see also the 
discussion in Dimity Kingsford Smith (2011) ‘ASIC regulation for the investor as consumer’ 29 Company and 
Securities Law Journal 327, 333-4. 
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As Gail Pearson has suggested ‘The statement implies that there should be differing rights to 
protective measures to mitigate risk depending on whether the activity is investment or 
consumption’.46 
However, even if this view is accepted, it is not sufficient justification for imposing a different level of 
base consumer protection for all financial services than for other goods and services. This is because 
many of the financial products that are regulated by the ASIC Act rather than the ACL(Cth) have no 
or minimal investment component, including deposit and transaction accounts, consumer credit and 
consumer leases, general insurance, and risk life insurance.47 And one of the largest parts of the 
financial services sector – superannuation – is underpinned by compulsory arrangements, so that all 
workers in Australia are required to engage in a level of financial investment, whether or not they 
wish to do so, and/or whether or not they have the capacity or aptitude for risk-taking or not. As 
Kingsford Smith notes in relation to the superannuation system: 
… all Australian employees have had to become investors either indirectly during the 
contribution phase of their lives, or directly in the retirement phase...48 
As many studies have pointed out, the level of financial sophistication and financial literacy varies 
considerably in Australia,49 and the compulsory nature of investment thought superannuation 
means that the treatment of all investors as needing less protection than consumers of other goods 
and services may no longer be appropriate.50 
The financial services sector is one of the largest sectors of the economy, and it is a sector that 
provides products and services to people of all levels of financial sophistication. This pervasive 
nature of the financial services sector makes the case for a consistency of general consumer 
protection standards between financial services and the rest of the economy even more pressing.  
2.2 General Protections of the ACL 
9. Are there any changes that could be made to improve their effectiveness, or address 
any of the issues raised in section 2.2? Are there any gaps that need to be addressed? 
2.2.3 Protecting consumers from unfair contract terms 
Should insurance contracts be treated in the same way as other standard form contracts 
46 Gail Pearson (2006) ‘Risk and the Consumer in Australian Financial Services Reform’ 28 Sydney Law Review 
99, 105. 
47 See also Pearson, ibid. 
48 Kingsford Smith, above n 45, 327-8. 
49 For example, see Kingsford Smith, ibid 329-330, and the studies discussed therein. See also The Social 
Research Centre and ANZ (2014) ANZ Survey of Financial Literary in Australia, available at 
http://www.anz.com/resources/3/1/31cbc1fd-9491-4a22-91dc-4c803e4c34ab/adult-financial-literacy-survey-
full-results.pdf.  
50 For example, Matthew Peckham (2015) ‘From the Wallis report to the Murray report: a critical analysis of 
the financial services regime between two financial system inquiries’ 33 Company and Securities Law Journal 
478, 499. 
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Insurance contracts are currently excluded from the provisions in the ASIC Act and ACL dealing with 
unfair contracts terms, implied warranties, and consumer guarantees. The Insurance Contracts Act 
1984 (Cth) also specifically excludes laws about contractual ‘unfairness’ from apply to insurance 
contracts regulated under that Act (s15). The policy justification for these exclusions has been the 
existence of the duty of utmost good faith that is imposed by the Insurance Contracts Act; a duty 
that is not imposed for other financial services. In 2013, a draft Bill (Insurance Contracts Amendment 
(Unfair Terms) Bill) was released for consultation. If implemented, the proposed legislation would 
have inserted an unfair contracts terms regime into the Insurance Contracts Act, equivalent to that 
in the ASIC Act. However, this Bill did not progress.  
As already mentioned, the ACL provisions, including the protection against unfair terms, should be 
regarded as bedrock consumer protections for financial services. Currently, the exclusion of 
insurance contracts from a number of the ACL protections is not consistent with the policy objective 
of the ACL, and this situation should be remedied. 
 
2.3 The ACL’s specific protections 
Consumer guarantees and financial services 
11. Are there any changes that could be made to improve their effectiveness or address any issues 
raised in section 2.3? Are there any gaps that need to be addressed or overseas models that could 
provide a useful guide?  
This section specifically addresses section 2.3.3: Whether the consumer guarantees should be 
extended to goods and services currently excluded, including financial services 
The most significant difference between the consumer protections in the ASIC Act and those in the 
ACL is the failure to extend the consumer guarantees regime to financial services. Instead, for 
financial services, the generic consumer rights in relation to quality of services are provided by an 
implied terms regime, in a similar form to that existing in the Trade Practices Act prior to the 
introduction of the ACL. As has been noted previously by Stephen Corones, this situation is ‘at odds 
with the policy objectives of consistency and uniformity which the ACL was intended to achieve’.51  
The explanatory material for the ACL and ASIC Act amendments make no specific references to any 
reason for excluding financial services from a consumer guarantees regime.  
Given that both the implied terms regime and the consumer guarantees regime use some similar 
terminology in describing the standards that are required (for example, ‘due care and skill’), it might 
be argued that the absence of a consumer guarantees regime in the financial services sector has 
little impact in practice. Indeed, the proposal to introduce consumer guarantees in the ACL was not 
51 Stephen Corones (2013) The Australian Consumer Law (Second edition, Thomson Reuters, Pyrmont NSW), 
19. 
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intended to lead to a difference in the substantive rights and obligations applicable.52 However, the 
rationale for replacing the former implied terms regime for the rest of the economy applies with 
equal force for the financial services sector. 
In its report on the implied terms law, the Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisory Council 
(‘CCAAC’) argued that the implied terms regime was problematic because: 
• The law was complex, and caused confusion and uncertainty in the marketplace; 
• The complexity of the law had contributed to a widespread lack of consumer understanding 
and awareness of their rights and obligations; 
• There were problems associated with individual redress; and 
• There was a lack of incentives for retailers and manufacturers to comply with the law and 
assist consumers.53 
These primary arguments for change generally apply equally in the financial services sector. One 
area where the financial services sector has perhaps a more positive outcome is in relation to the 
existence of cost effective dispute resolution mechanisms for consumers – the establishment of 
industry ombudsman schemes in the financial services sector has addressed this problem to some 
extent. However, even with the external dispute resolution schemes in the financial services sector, 
a statutory guarantees regime is preferable to an implied terms regime. As CCAAC noted, a 
consumer guarantees regime allows consumer to ‘build stronger cases when bringing a matter to an 
ombudsman’54  
Further, the CCAAC report did not suggest that financial services should be excluded from its 
recommendation. Instead, CCAAC argued that: “Consistent with the intention of the Australian 
Consumer Law, the new statutory consumer guarantees should apply to all sectors of the 
economy.”55  
CCAAC’s support of economy-wide application of consumer guarantees is also evident from its 
recommendation that the consumer guarantees regime should apply to sectors where there was 
already regulation of quality (specifically electricity, gas and telecommunications).56  CCAAC also 
envisaged that the consumer guarantees regime would apply to financial services, as it referred to 
ASIC as one of the government agencies to be involved in developing information material, identify 
emerging issues in relation to consumer guarantees, and coordinating regulatory and enforcement 
responses to these issues.’57 
Since the CCAAC report, the industry specific obligations relating to quality have arguably become 
even more onerous in the financial services sector, including through the introduction of the best 
interests duty and other changes in the Future of Financial Advice (‘FOFA’) Reforms. However, this 
does not obviate the need for the generally applicable consumer protections to apply, including the 
52 See, for example, discussion of the relevant policy documents on this point in Corones, ibid, 373-4. 
53 Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisory Council (2009) Consumer rights: reforming statutory implied 
conditions and warranties (Final Report, October 2009), 4-13. 
54 Ibid 73. 
55 Ibid 124. 
56 Ibid 122. 
57 Ibid 124. 
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consumer guarantees. Apart from anything else, there are likely to be many transactions in the 
financial services sector where the FOFA obligations do not apply.58 There are also many other 
service sectors that have detailed industry-specific regulation of quality, but still also have the 
consumer guarantees as providing the bedrock, basic protection for consumers, including the legal 
and insolvency professions, builders and other trades, and others.  
CCAAC also noted the importance of a consumer guarantees regime for dispute resolution. As noted 
above, Ombudsman schemes are particularly prevalent in the financial services sector, and financial 
services consumers should equally have access to a consumer guarantees regime that. 
In relation to the rationale for not extending the consumer guarantees to financial services, Paterson 
and Tokeley have suggested that ‘presumably it was considered inappropriate to guarantee the 
fitness or quality of a financial product’.59 However, even if this argument were to be accepted, this 
would not be an argument for excluding financial services from the services-related guarantees. 
Indeed, the implied terms in the ASIC Act only incorporate the former TPA implied terms as they 
relate to services, not goods.  
Given that the quality expectation imposed by the statutory guarantees for services (eg, due care 
and skill) is the same as the quality expectation in the implied warranties, the failure to extend the at 
least the services component of the consumer guarantees regime to financial services is not 
justified, and should be remedied through this Review.  
 
Other ACL provisions that have no equivalent in the ASIC Act 
This section specifically addresses sections 2.3.5 (Providing consumers with rights when a 
salesperson approaches uninvited) and 2.3.6 (Other consumer rights in transacting with 
a supplier) in the Issues Paper 
There are also a number of other provisions in the ACL that have no equivalent in the ASIC Act. Some 
of these apply only in the case of goods, and so would be inappropriate to include in the ASIC Act 
(absent a policy decision that financial products should be considered goods). However, others apply 
to both goods and services, and thus would appear to have relevance for financial services. These 
include provisions dealing with single pricing (s48 ACL), unsolicited consumer agreements (Part 3-2, 
Division 2 ACL), proof of transaction (s100 ACL), and information standards (Part 3-4 ACL).  
In some cases, there are provisions that seek to address a similar policy issue for financial services in 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘CA’) and/or National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) 
(‘NCCPA’), including the National Credit Code (‘NCC’).  
58 For example, the FOFA obligations only apply when personal advice is being provided; they have no 
application in the case of general advice or transactions than do not involve advice (CA s961(1)).  
59 Jeannie Paterson and Kate Tokeley, ‘Consumer guarantees’ in Justin Malbon and Luke Nottage (eds), 
Consumer Law and Policy in Australia and New Zealand (The Federation Press 2013), 103-4. 
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• Single Pricing: Neither the Corporations Act nor the NCCPA specifically include a provision 
dealing with single pricing. However, both pieces of legislation provide for mandatory 
disclosure documents that must include all relevant costs of a product or service (eg, 
Product Disclosure Statement, Financial Services Guide, Credit Guide, pre-contractual 
statements, credit contract). The NCCPA also provides for restrictions on advertising of 
prices (for example, if an advertisement contains repayment amounts, it must also contain 
the interest rate (s150(3) NCC)).  
• Unsolicited sales: Similarly, both the Corporations Act and the NCCPA have provisions 
dealing with unsolicited sales (for example, Corporations Act ss 736, 992A, 992AA; NCC 
s156). However, the NCC applies only to visits to a consumer’s home, whereas the CA and 
ACL provisions also apply to unsolicited telephone calls. There are other variations between 
the provisions, as to disclosure requirements, a presumption that the agreement is an 
unsolicited agreement, and other matters. It is also important to note that the Issues Paper 
asks whether the current provisions in the ACL are sufficient to deal with new modes of 
business – these issues may apply equally to financial services.  
• Proof of transaction: The CA requires a confirmation of transactions involving a financial 
product (s1017F), and both the Corporations Act and NCCPA oblige financial services 
providers to regular statements of account, which confirm individual transactions 
(Corporations Act s 1017D; NCC s33), and to provide a written statement of the 
remuneration for advice and assistance services (eg Corporations Act, s942 (Product 
Disclosure Statement); NCCPA, s113 (Credit Guide), s114 (Credit Quote)).  
• Information standards: There does not appear to be any equivalent in the CA or NCCPA to 
the broad information standards power contained in Part 3-4 ACL. However, some 
information standards have effectively been introduced for particular products – for 
example, suppliers of small amount credit contracts must include a specified statement on 
their premises and websites (NCCPA s133CB), and both the CA and NCCPA provide for 
mandatory warnings and information to be disclosed in certain circumstances (eg, CA s949A 
(warning about general advice); NCCPA s163 (warning about the comparison rate)). 
Additionally, the proposed product intervention power and product design and distribution 
obligation (recommended in the 2014 Financial System Inquiry, and agreed to by the 
Commonwealth Government) could be mechanisms for providing mandatory information 
standards.60 
It is, however, it is important to ensure that these alternative mechanisms of addressing the policy 
issues covered by the ACL provisions do not result in gaps in protection for financial services 
consumers.  In the case of unsolicited sales for example, two obvious gaps are that, for consumer 
credit contracts, there is no prohibition on unsolicited telephone sales; and for both consumer credit 
and financial products, there is no rebuttable presumption that the agreement was unsolicited. 
Other gaps might exist because of the different standards applicable, and differences in the scope of 
the persons to whom protection is extended. The ACL Review should take the opportunity to 
60 For example, the Financial System Inquiry suggested that a product intervention power could include powers 
to ‘require or impose amendments to marketing and disclosure materials, warnings to consumers, and 
labelling or terminology changes, distribution restrictions and product banning’: Commonwealth of Australia 
(2014) Financial System Inquiry (Final Report, December), 206. 
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address this by ensuring that substantively the same provisions apply to financial services and to 
other goods and services, and that any alternative provisions in the CA or NCCPA provide equivalent 
or better coverage. 
 
2.4 Other issues 
2..4.2 Interaction between the ACL and ASIC Act 
17. Does the current approach to defining a ‘financial service’ in the ASIC Act create unnecessary 
complexity in determining whether certain conduct falls within the scope of the ASIC Act or the 
ACL? How could this be addressed? 
If financial services are to continue being regulated by the ASIC Act, it is critical that there is a 
uniform definition in the ASIC Act and ACL. Without a uniform definition, there is a risk of gaps in 
coverage.  
This issue of the complexity of the definition of financial service in the ASIC Act cannot be examined 
without also considering the definition of financial service in the Corporations Act, as this broadly 
mirrors the ASIC Act definition, at least in structure. This consistency in structure should preferably 
be maintained. 
The complexity of the definitions and the consumer protection regulation of financial services 
generally, was strongly criticised by Rares J in his summary in Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman 
Brothers Australia Ltd (in liq) [2012] FCA 1028 (21 September 2012). In relation to the claims of 
misleading or deceptive conduct in the case, Rares J notes: 
The repealed, simple and comprehensives 52of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) that 
prohibited corporations engaging in misleading or deceptive conduct in trade or commerce 
has been done away with by a morass of dense, difficult to understand legislation. Those 
Acts, that now deal with misleading and deceptive conduct, apply differently depending on 
distinctions such as whether the alleged misleading conduct is in relation to “a financial 
product or a financial service” (s 1041H(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)) or “financial 
services”(s 12DA(1)of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth)). 
Those apparently simple terms are nothing of the sort. A “financial product” is defined in 
mind-boggling detail in 7 pages of small type in Div 3 of Pt 7.1 of the Corporations Act while 
a “financial service” takes another 6 pages to be defined in Div 4 of Pt 7.1. The ASIC Act only 
takes about 4 pages to define “financial service” in s 12BAB. Obviously, there are differences 
in what each of these Acts and definitions cover – but why? The cost to the community, 
business, the parties and their lawyers, and the time for courts to work out which law 
applies have no rational or legal justification. The Parliament should consider returning to a 
simple clear two line long universal norm of conduct, as was contained in s 52, if it considers 
that misleading and deceptive conduct in trade or commerce ought be prohibited. 
As Rares J notes, the definitions of financial service (and of financial product) in the CA are more 
complex than those in the ASIC Act, and are narrower in scope. A major difference between the 
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definitions in the ASIC Act and Corporations Act is the inclusion of ‘credit facility’ in the definition of 
financial product in the ASIC Act, but the exclusion of ‘credit facility’ from the equivalent definition in 
the CA. However, this is not the only difference between the definitions. 
The ASIC Act and CA play different roles in consumer / investor protection in the financial services, 
and this necessitates there being a different level of coverage of products/services between the two 
Acts. The ASIC Act imposes the general consumer obligations – applicable to both financial services 
in the traditional sense, and credit products and services, and, in most cases, able to be taken 
advantage of by businesses as well as consumers. In contrast, the detailed, industry specific 
regulation is contained in the CA (for financial products and services) and in the NCCPA (for 
consumer credit products and services), and these protections are only available to retail investors / 
consumers.  
In the absence of a policy decision that financial products and services (in the more traditional 
sense) and credit products and services should both operate under the same regulatory regime, it 
would not be appropriate to have the more expansive definition of financial service in the CA. 
Equally, imposing the narrower CA definition of financial product in the ASIC Act would result in 
credit products being regulated by the ACL(Cth) and ACCC, rather than ASIC, which is clearly 
unwarranted in light of ASIC’s regulatory responsibility for the NCCPA.  
However, there is potential to simplify improve the way in which the general and industry-specific 
consumer protections are provided in financial services, including through amending the different 
definitions of financial product and service.  
One option might be to amend the definition of financial service so that it is a simplified, broader, 
purpose-focused definition. This approach has been suggested by Emily Klotz, in the context of her 
review of the overlap between the ASIC Act and CA in prohibition of misleading or deceptive 
conduct.61 Klotz suggests that ‘A broad, purpose-focused definition removes the need to wade 
through technical provisions and allows courts to consider whether a facility was used for a 
particular purpose that parliament intended ASIC regulate’. 62 However, it is arguable that the 
current definitions are in fact purpose-focused. In addition, leaving it to the courts to determine 
whether a facility ‘was used for a particular purpose that parliament intended ASIC regulate’ seems 
liable to create significant commercial uncertainty, at least in relation to issues about whether the 
obligations in Chapter 7 of the CA will be imposed on a particular facility.  
Klotz has also argued that the definition of financial service in the CA and ASIC Act should be the 
same, at least for the prohibition against misleading or deceptive conduct. However, she also 
acknowledges that this approach of a single definition in the ASIC Act and CA would not be 
appropriate for other parts of the CA (including chapter 7). Apart from anything else, to have the 
same definition across the ASIC Act and CA would result in the licensing, disclosure and conduct 
61 Emily Klotz (2015) ‘Misleading or deceptive conduct in the provision of financial services: an empirical and 
theoretical critique of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001 (Cth)’ 33 Company and Securities Law Journal 451, 477. 
62 Ibid. 
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obligations in chapter 7 also applying to credit products. Avoiding this would require separate 
definitions of financial service for the detailed Ch. 7 protections compared to the general (ACL0-like) 
consumer protections in the CA; and this seems likely to add further difficulties, costs and 
uncertainties.  
Another option might be to have the same definition of financial product / financial service in the 
ASIC Act and CA, with that definition being linked to the products and services that are to be 
regulated under chapter 7 of the CA. To give the ASIC Act the broader coverage that it requires, the 
ASIC Act could then apply to financial products / services as defined in the CA, as well as credit 
facilities, and any other financial (in the broad sense) products/ services that are to be excluded 
from Ch. 7.  
If an approach along these lines was taken, s12DA(1) ASIC Act could be amended in the following 
way: 
A person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct in relation to: 
(a) Financial services; 
(b) Credit services;  
(c) [Any other products / services that need to be excluded from Ch. 7 
coverage] 
that is misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive.  
However, while simplifying some aspects, this approach may still result in complex definition 
provisions in the ASIC Act if, for example, there are a large number of different types of facilities that 
need to be excluded from the provisions in chapter 7 of the CA.  
A simpler solution seems possible. As between the ASIC Act and the ACL, the major difficulty caused 
by the complexity of the definition of financial service is that it creates additional costs and time in 
determining whether the ACCC or ASIC is best placed to take action, whether or not a delegation of 
powers between the ACCC and ASIC is required, and whether claims are to be made under the ASIC 
Act or the ACL(Cth).63 In the context of misleading or deceptive conduct, where the substantive law 
is the same in the ASIC Act and the ACL, Klotz suggests that this considerable attention to threshold 
issues has not substantially benefited claimants.64  
If it is an accepted policy position that the substance of the ACL provisions should apply to financial 
services in the same way that they apply to other goods and services, these difficulties and costs 
could be overcome by repealing both Part 2, Div 2 of the ASIC Act and s131A of the CCA. In this way, 
the ACL (Cth) would apply to all products and services in the economy, including financial services.  
ASIC could retain responsibility for enforcing and administering the ACL as it applies to financial 
service and credit services, but this could be put in place through administrative arrangements, 
including the ASIC-ACCC Memorandum of Understanding. A broad definition of the products and 
63 For a detailed discussion of these costs in particular cases, see Klotz, ibid 458-463.  
64 Ibid 452. 
40 
 
                                                           
 
services that ASIC would take responsibility for could be developed for the purposes of the 
administrative arrangements; among other things, it would clearly be appropriate for ASIC to take 
responsibility for matters that involve both contraventions of the CA or NCCPA and contraventions 
of the general consumer protections in the ACL, or that involve holders of an AFSL or ACL. There 
would be no need for a definition of financial product or financial service in the ACL itself. 
Further, the current exclusion of the mandatory disclosure documents in the ASIC Act (eg, s12DA(2)) 
could be introduced as part of s18 ACL, again with requiring any definition of financial product or 
service in the ACL.  
As well as addressing the uncertainty and costs associated with inadvertently proceeding under the 
wrong legislation, or pleading under numerous pieces of legislation, where there is doubt; this 
approach would ensure that the basic consumer protections apply equally to financial services as to 
other goods and services, and eliminate the delays that have sometimes been caused when 
amendments to the ACL provisions are not implemented at the same time in the ASIC Act (as was 
the case with changes to the unconscionability provisions). This approach would ensure that the 
basic bedrock of consumer protection standards applies equally across the economy.  
A uniform application of the ACL(Cth) to all sectors of the economy, with enforcement responsibility 
shared between ASIC (for credit and financial services) and the ACCC seems to provide a more 
effective solution than the current arrangements.  
Of course, this approach would not change the complexity of the definitions of financial product and 
financial service in the CA. A separate project might be needed here. However, given ASIC’s powers 
to issue class orders to clarify the application of the provisions in chapter 7 to particular products, 
this is perhaps less of an immediate concern. This solution perhaps also raises an issue for the future 
as to the extent to which financial products might be considered to be ‘goods’ (and thus subject to, 
for example, the consumer guarantees of acceptable quality). Again, this is perhaps a larger project, 
but it seems unlikely that the current interpretation of ‘goods’ in the ACL would extent to cover 
financial products, without specific amendment to the ACL. 
 
 
Other matters relevant to the ACL and financial services 
Structure and wording of ASIC Act provisions 
If the proposal for financial services to be included in the ACL is not accepted, it will be important to 
make changes to the ASIC Act to ensure that there is consistency of coverage between the ASIC Act 
and the ACL. In addition to the absence of the particular obligations discussed above, the ASIC Act 
provisions also differ in their structure and specific wording in some areas where the policy coverage 
is similar. The ACL is structured in a more coherent and easy to navigate layout when compared to 
the ASIC Act; in particular, the division of the ACL into general protections and specific protections is 
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a useful approach. However, the consumer protection provisions in the ASIC Act have not been 
similarly structured, making them more difficult to navigate and to understand.  
Further, with the introduction of the ACL, some of the long-standing provisions in the Trade 
Practices Act were amended to clarify the operation of the provisions (for example, the pyramid 
selling provisions in ss44-46 ACL). However, these changes have not been made in the ASIC Act.  
The differences between similar provisions in the ASIC Act and ACL could lead to confusion and 
inconsistent outcomes, and are unnecessary. With the exception of text that only has application to 
goods, the text of the substantive obligations in the ASIC Act and the ACL should be the same. 
Amendments should be made to ensure that the general consumer protections in the ASIC Act have 
the same wording (subject to references to goods) as the equivalent provisions in the ACL.  
 
The role of the State and Territory Fair Trading Agencies in the context of financial services 
Financial services are excluded from the ACL only insofar as the ACL is relied on as Commonwealth 
legislation. Section 131A of the Competition and Consumer Act has no application to the ACL when it 
is relied on as a law of a State or Territory (for example, Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld), s16). Further, 
the various State and Territory Fair Trading Acts do not exempt financial services from the ACL as a 
State or Territory law.65 The Issues Paper also notes that the exclusion in s131A CCA ‘does not affect 
the powers of the state and territory regulators with regard to the ACL, as applied at the State and 
Territory level’. 
This creates an anomalous situation. For example, on their face, it appears that the consumer 
guarantees do not apply to financial services under the ACL(Cth), but they could apply to financial 
services under the ACL(Qld).66 Thus, where there are differences between the ASIC Act and the ACL, 
different outcomes could result if matters proceeded under the State legislation rather than the ASIC 
Act. Even if the State and Territory agencies determine not to take any action in relation to financial 
products, this would not prevent private action under the relevant State or Territory legislation.  
This anomaly needs to be clarified. Re-incorporating financial services into the ACL would be one 
way to minimise the consequences of any regulatory uncertainty on this point. However, if this 
change is not accepted, it will be important that the ASIC Act provisions are consistent with those in 
the ACL to remove the risk of differential outcomes depending on whether the ASIC Act or the 
State/Territory legislation is relied upon. 
 
 
 
65 For example, there is no reference to financial products or services in the Fair Trading Act (Qld). 
66 This has also been suggested by Paterson and Tokeley, above n 59, 104 (footnote 49). 
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Industry codes of practice 
The place of industry codes in the consumer law framework is unclear. The CCA provides for the 
establishment of mandatory and voluntary industry codes, with contravention of an applicable 
industry code prohibited (Part IVB CCA). However, the codes that have prescribed under Part IVB are 
few in number, and the majority cover relationships between businesses, rather than relationships 
between businesses and consumers.  
Industry codes have played a larger role in other sectors – including the telecommunications and 
financial services sector. In the case of the financial services sector, there are a number of long-
standing industry codes, which are voluntary in application, but are, theoretically at least, binding 
upon a business that has subscribed to the relevant Code.67 Both the CA and NCCPA give ASIC 
powers to approve a code,68 but there is no regulatory requirement to belong to an approved 
code.69  
Non-compliance with a financial services code can be considered by the relevant code compliance 
body, but these often have limited sanctioning powers.70 Non-compliance can also be considered by 
an External Dispute Resolution scheme when determining how a dispute should be resolved. In a 
litigation context, non-compliance with an industry code may also be relevant to a claim of 
unconscionable conduct (eg, s12CC(1)(h) ASIC Act), and/or a claim of misleading or deceptive 
conduct (eg, s12DA ASIC Act).71 More recently, claimants have also been raising breaches of the 
Banking Code as a defence in litigation. Here, the argument that, as the Code is incorporated into 
the terms and conditions of a product or service with a bank, non-compliance with a provision of the 
Code amounts to a breach of contract, with the result that contractual remedies such as damages or 
termination may be available. However, these arguments have not always been successful in the 
courts, and there has not been a consistent approach by the courts to the status and enforceability 
of the Code.72 
The ACL Review provides an opportunity to consider the role of codes generally, and in the financial 
services sector specifically. In particular, consideration should be given to ways in which there could 
be greater encouragement for suppliers to seek approval or registration of codes, and more serious 
consequences for contravening a code that has been approved or registered. Without a genuine 
enforcement and sanctioning method behind them, industry codes can be merely promotional 
vehicles with little real substance for the consumers who are designed to benefit from those codes.  
67 See, for example, Code of Banking Practice 2013, cl 12.3. 
68 CA s1011A; NCCPA s 241. 
69 Note that this contrasts with the situation for dispute resolution – all AFSL and ACL licence holders must 
belong to an ASIC-approved EDR scheme if they provide services to retail clients / consumers: CA s912A(1)(g); 
NCCPA s47(1)(i). 
70 For example, the only sanction available to the Code Compliance Monitoring Committee is to name a bank: 
Code of Banking Practice 2013, cl 36(j).  
71 See ASIC RG183 ‘Approval of financial services sector codes of conduct’ (March 2013), RG183.148-9. 
72 See the discussion in Nicola Howell (2014) ‘Revisiting the Australian Code of Banking Practice: Is self-
regulation still relevant for improving consumer standards?’ 38 (2) UNSW Law Journal 544, 582. 
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Recommendations from the Financial System Inquiry 
This Review also provides the opportunity to consider whether recommendations from the recent 
Financial System Inquiry may also have wider application, and be appropriate for consideration in 
the ACL. This includes the recommendations to provide the regulator with a product intervention 
power (recommendation 22) and to impose a principles-based product design and distribution 
obligation on suppliers (recommendation 21). 
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